

# Safety Programmable Controller

MELSEC QS series

# Safety Application Guide





(Read these precautions before using this product.)

Before using the product, please read this manual, the relevant manuals introduced in this manual, standard programmable controller manuals, and the safety standards carefully and pay full attention to safety to handle the product correctly.

In this manual, the safety precautions are classified into two levels: " MARNING" and " MCAUTION".



Under some circumstances, failure to observe the precautions given under " A CAUTION" may lead to serious consequences.

Observe the precautions of both levels because they are important for personal and system safety. Make sure that the end users read this manual and then keep the manual in a safe place for future reference.

## [Design Precautions]

WARNING
•When a safety programmable controller detects an error in an external power supply or a failure in programmable controller main module, it turns off all the outputs.
Create an external circuit to securely stop the power of hazard by turning off the outputs. Incorrect configuration may result in an accident.
Create short current protection for a safety relay, and a protection circuit such as a fuse, and breaker, outside a safety programmable controller.
If load current more than the rating or overcurrent due to a short circuit in the load has flowed in the CC-Link Safety remote I/O module, the module defines it as a fault and turns off all the outputs. However, if overcurrent flows in the CC-Link Safety remote I/O module for a long time, it may cause smoke or a fire. To prevent it, create a safety circuit such as a fuse outside the module.
●When data/program change, or status control is performed from a PC to a running safety programmable controller, create an interlock circuit outside the sequence program and safety programmable controller to ensure that the whole system always operates safely.
For the operations to a safety programmable controller, pay full attention to safety by reading the relevant manuals carefully, and establishing the operating procedure.
Furthermore, for the online operations performed from a PC to a safety CPU module, the corrective actions against a communication error due to a cable connection fault, etc. should be predetermined as a system.
All output signals from a safety CPU module to the CC-Link Safety master modules are prohibited to use.
These signals can be found in the CC-Link Safety System Master Module User's Manual. Do not turn ON or OFF these signals by sequence program, since turning ON/OFF these output signals of the programmable controller system may cause malfunctions and safety operation cannot be guaranteed.
All output signals from a safety CPU module to the CC-Link IE Field Network master/local modules (with safety functions) are prohibited to use.
These signals can be found in the MELSEC-QS CC-Link IE Field Network Master/Local Module User's Manual.
Do not turn ON or OFF these signals by sequence program, since turning ON/OFF these output signals of the programmable controller system may cause malfunctions and safety operation cannot be guaranteed.

## [Design Precautions]

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When a CC-Link Safety remote I/O module has detected CC-Link Safety error, it turns off all the outputs.

Note that the outputs in a sequence program are not automatically turned off.

If CC-Link Safety or CC-Link IE Field Network error has been detected, create a sequence program that turns off the outputs in the program.

If the CC-Link Safety or CC-Link IE Field Network is restored with the outputs on, it may suddenly operate and result in an accident.

● To inhibit restart without manual operation after safety functions was performed and outputs were turned OFF, create an interlock program which uses a reset button for restart.

## [Design Precautions]

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Do not bunch the wires of external devices or communication cables together with the main circuit or power lines, or install them close to each other.

They should be installed 100mm or more from each other.

Not doing so could result in noise that would cause malfunctions.

Select the external devices to be connected to the CC-Link Safety remote I/O module, considering the maximum inrush current with reference to the CC-Link Safety System Remote I/O Module User's Manual.

## [Installation Precautions]

<ul> <li>Use a safety programmable controller in the environment that meets the general specifications described in the QSCPU User's Manual (Hardware Design, Maintenance and Inspection).</li> <li>Using this programmable controller in an environment outside the range of the general specifications could result in electric shock, fire, erroneous operation, and damage to or deterioration of the product.</li> </ul>
While pressing the installation lever located at the bottom of module, insert the module fixing tab into the fixing hole in the base unit until it stops. Then, securely mount the module with the fixing hole as a supporting point.
Incorrect loading of the module can cause a failure or drop.
Secure the module to the base unit with screws.
Tighten the screw in the specified torque range.
If the screws are too loose, it may cause a drop of the screw or module.
Overtightening may cause a drop due to the damage of the screw or module.
Make sure to fix the CC-Link Safety remote I/O module with a DIN rail or fixing screws and tighten the screws with the specified torque.
If the screws are too loose, it may cause a drop of the screw or module.
Overtightening may cause a drop due to the damage of the screw or module.
Completely turn off the external supply power used in the system before mounting or removing the module.
Not doing so could result in damage to the product.
Do not directly touch the module's conductive parts or electronic components.
Doing so may cause malfunctions or a failure.

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- Be sure to shut off all phases of the external supply power used by the system before wiring. Not completely turning off all power could result in electric shock or damage to the product.
- •When energizing or operating the module after installation or wiring, be sure to close the attached terminal cover.

Not doing so may result in electric shock.

## [Wiring Precautions]

Ground the FG and LG terminals correctly.			
Not doing so could result in electric shock or malfunctions.			
Use a solderless terminal with insulation sleeve for wiring of a terminal block.			
Use up to two solderless terminals for a single terminal.			
●Use applicable solderless terminals and tighten them with the specified torque. If any solderless			
spade terminal is used, it may be disconnected when the terminal screw comes loose, resulting in a failure.			
Wire the module correctly after confirming the rated voltage and terminal layout.			
Connecting a power supply of a different rated voltage or incorrect wiring may cause a fire or failure.			
Tighten a terminal block mounting screw, terminal screw, and module fixing screw within the specified torque range.			
If the terminal block mounting screw or terminal screw is too loose, it may cause a short circuit, fire,			
or manunctions.			
short circuit or malfunctions.			
If the module fixing screw is too loose, it may cause a drop of the screw or module.			
Overtightening the screw may cause a drop due to the damage of the screw or module.			
Be sure there are no foreign substances such as sawdust or wiring debris inside the module.			
Such debris could cause a fire, failure, or malfunctions.			
The module has an ingress prevention label on its top to prevent foreign matter, such as wire offcuts,			
from entering the module during wiring.			
Do not peel this label during wiring.			
Before starting system operation, be sure to peel this label because of heat dissipation.			

## [Wiring Precautions]

Be sure to fix the communication cables or power cables by ducts or clamps when connecting them
to the module.
Failure to do so may cause damage of the module or cables due to a wobble, unintentional shifting,
or accidental pull of the cables, or malfunctions due to poor contact of the cable.
When removing the connected communication cables or power cables, do not pull the cable with grasping the cable part.
Remove the cable connected to the terminal block after loosening the terminal block screws.
Pulling the cable connected to a module may result in malfunctions or damage of the module or cable.
For the cables to be used in the CC-Link Safety, use the ones specified by the manufacturer.
Otherwise, the performance of the CC-Link Safety is not guaranteed.
As to the maximum overall cable length and station - to station cable length, follow the specifications
described in the CC-Link Safety System Master Module User's Manual.
If not following the specification, the normal data transmission is not guaranteed.
●For the cables to be used in CC-Link IE Field Network, use the ones specified by the manufacturer.
Otherwise, the performance of CC-Link IE Field Network is not guaranteed.
As to the maximum overall cable length and station - to station cable length, follow the specifications
described in the MELSEC-QS CC-Link IE Field Network Master/Local Module User's Manual.
If not following the specification, the normal data transmission is not guaranteed.
Install our programmable controller in a control panel for use.
Wire the main power supply to the power supply module installed in a control panel through a
distribution terminal block.
Furthermore, the wiring and replacement of a power supply module have to be performed by a
maintenance worker who acquainted with shock protection.
For the wiring methods, refer to the QSCPU User's Manual (Hardware Design, Maintenance and
Inspection).

## [Startup and Maintenance precautions]

#### WARNING Do not touch the terminals while power is on. Doing so could result in electric shock. Correctly connect the battery connector. Also, do not charge, disassemble, heat, place in fire, short circuit, or solder the battery. Mishandling of battery can cause overheating, cracks, or ignition which could result in injury and fires. • Turn off all phases of the external supply power used in the system when cleaning the module or retightening the terminal block mounting screws, terminal screws, or module fixing screws. Not doing so could result in electric shock. Tighten a terminal block mounting screw, terminal screw, and module fixing screw within the specified torque range. If the terminal block mounting screw or terminal screw is too loose, it may cause a short circuit, fire, or malfunctions. If too tight, it may damage the screw and/or the module, resulting in a drop of the screw or module, a short circuit or malfunctions. If the module fixing screw is too loose, it may cause a drop of the screw or module. Overtightening the screw may cause a drop due to the damage of the screw or module.

## [Startup and Maintenance precautions]

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- The online operations performed from a PC to a running safety programmable controller (Program change when a safety CPU module is RUN, device test, and operating status change such as RUN-STOP switching) have to be executed after the manual has been carefully read and the safety has been ensured.
  - Following the operating procedure predetermined at designing, the operation has to be performed by an instructed person.
  - When changing a program while a safety CPU module is RUN (Write during RUN), it may cause a program breakdown in some operating conditions.
  - Fully understand the precautions described in the GX Developer's manual before use.
- Do not disassemble or modify the modules.
  - Doing so could cause a failure, malfunctions, injury, or fire.
  - If the product is repaired or remodeled by other than the specified FA centers or us, the warranty is not covered.
- Use any radio communication device such as a cellular phone or a PHS phone more than 25cm away in all directions of safety programmable controller.
  Not doing as any asymptotic participations.
  - Not doing so can cause malfunctions.

## [Startup and Maintenance precautions]

Completely turn off the external supply power used in the system before mounting or removing the
module.
Not doing so may result in a failure or malfunctions of the module.
Restrict the mounting/removal of a module, base unit, and terminal block up to 50 times (IEC 61131-2 compliant), after the first use of the product.
Failure to do so may cause the module to malfunction due to poor contact of connector.
Do not drop or give an impact to the battery mounted to the module.
Doing so may damage the battery, causing the battery fluid to leak inside the battery.
If the battery is dropped or given an impact, dispose of it without using.
Before touching the module, always touch grounded metal, etc. to discharge static electricity from human body, etc.
Not doing so may result in a failure or malfunctions of the module.
Since the module case is made of resin, do not drop or apply any strong impact to the module.
Doing so may damage the module.
Shut off the external power supply (all phases) used in the system before installing or removing a module to/from a control panel.
Not doing so may result in a failure or malfunctions of the module.

## [Disposal Precautions]

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When disposing of this product, treat it as industrial waste.
 When disposing of batteries, separate them from other wastes according to the local regulations.
 (For details of the Battery Directive in EU member states, refer to the QSCPU User's Manual (Hardware Design, Maintenance and Inspection).)

## [Transportation Precautions]

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When transporting lithium batteries, make sure to treat them based on the transport regulations. (For details of the controlled models, refer to the QSCPU User's Manual (Hardware Design, Maintenance and Inspection).)

## CONDITIONS OF USE FOR THE PRODUCT

- (1) Although MELCO has obtained the certification for Product's compliance to the international safety standards IEC61508, ISO13849-1 from TUV Rheinland, this fact does not guarantee that Product will be free from any malfunction or failure. The user of this Product shall comply with any and all applicable safety standard, regulation or law and take appropriate safety measures for the system in which the Product is installed or used and shall take the second or third safety measures other than the Product. MELCO is not liable for damages that could have been prevented by compliance with any applicable safety standard, regulation or law.
- (2) MELCO prohibits the use of Products with or in any application involving, and MELCO shall not be liable for a default, a liability for defect warranty, a quality assurance, negligence or other tort and a product liability in these applications.
  - (a) power plants,
  - (b) trains, railway systems, airplanes, airline operations, other transportation systems,
  - (c) hospitals, medical care, dialysis and life support facilities or equipment,
  - (d) amusement equipments,
  - (e) incineration and fuel devices,
  - (f) handling of nuclear or hazardous materials or chemicals,
  - (g) mining and drilling,
  - (h) and other applications where the level of risk to human life, health or property are elevated.

## REVISIONS

The manual number is given on the bottom left of the back cover.

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#### INTRODUCTION

Thank you for purchasing the Mitsubishi Electric safety programmable controller MELSEC-QS series. Before using the equipment, please read this manual carefully to develop full familiarity with the functions and performance of the QS series programmable controller you have purchased, so as to ensure correct use.

When applying the program examples introduced in this manual to the actual system, ensure the applicability and confirm that it will not cause system control problems.

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#### MANUAL

The manual related to this product is shown below. Please place an order as needed.

Related manuals	
Manual name	Manual number (Model code)
Safety Guidelines	IR 0800424
Explains the specifications of the QSCPU, safety power supply module and safety base unit, etc. (Supplied with the product)	(13JY84)
QSCPU User's Manual (Hardware Design, Maintenance and Inspection)	
Explains the specifications of the QSCPU, safety power supply module, safety base unit, etc. (Sold separately)	(13JR92)
QSCPU User's Manual (Function Explanation, Program Fundamentals)	
Explains the functions, programming methods, devices, etc. that are necessary to create programs with the QSCPU.	SH-080627ENG (13JR93)
OSCPLI Programming Manual (Common Instructions)	
Explains how to use the sequence instructions, basic instructions, application instructions, and QSCPU dedicated instructions. (Sold separately)	SH-080628ENG (13JW01)
QSCPU Programming Manual (Safety FB)	
Explains how to use safety function blocks. (Sold separately)	SH-080744ENG (13JW05)
CC-Link Safety System Master Module User's Manual	
Explains the specifications, procedures and settings up to operation, parameter settings and trouble shootings of the QS0J61BT12 type CC-Link Safety system master module.	SH-080600ENG (13JP88)
(Sold separately)	
CC-Link Safety System Remote I/O Module User's Manual	
Explains the specifications, procedures and settings up to operation, parameter settings and	SH-080612ENG
trouble shootings of the CC-Link Safety remote I/O module.	(13JR89)
(Sold separately)	
Explains the overview of CC-Link IE Field Network, and specifications, procedures before operation, system configuration, installation, wiring, settings, functions, programming, and troubleshooting of the CC-Link IE Field Network master/local module (with safety functions).	SH-080969ENG (13JZ53)
(Sold separately)	
MELSEC-Q CC-Link IE Controller Network Reference Manual Explains the system configuration, performance specifications, functions, handling, wiring, and troubleshooting of the CC-Link IE Controller Network. (Sold separately)	SH-080668ENG (13JV16)
Q Corresponding MELSECNET/H Network System Reference Manual (PLC to PLC network)	
Explains the specifications for a MELSECNET/H network system for PLC to PLC network, the	SH-080049
procedures and settings up to operation, parameter settings, programming and troubleshooting.	(13JF92)
(Sold separately)	
Q Corresponding Ethernet Interface Module User's Manual (Basic) Explains the specifications, procedures for data communication with external devices, line connection (open/close), fixed buffer communication, random access buffer communication, and troubleshooting of the Ethernet module. (Sold separately)	SH-080009 (13JL88)

Remark	
If you would like to obtain a manual individually, printed materials are available separately. Order the manual by quoting the manual number on the table above (model code).	
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#### **HOW THIS MANUAL IS ORGANIZED**

The section in this manual or another relevant manual that can be referred to is shown as follows:

(Section 3.5)

In addition, this manual provides the following explanations.

#### ⊠POINT -

In addition to description of the page, notes or functions that require special attention are described here.



#### HOW TO USE THIS MANUAL

This manual describes the points to be concerned when configuring safety application that meets the safety standards using the safety programmable controller. Although the safety application configuration example is shown in CHAPTER 5 and CHAPTER 6 of this manual, authentication is not obtained. The safety standards conformance approval must be obtained for the user with the entire safety-related system.

This manual is classified roughly into five chapters as shown below.

CHAPTER 1	Describes the outline of the safety programmable controller.
CHAPTER 2	Describes the safety application that is configured using the safety
	programmable controller.
CHAPTER 3	Describes the risk assessment, Category, and SIL.
CHAPTER 4	Describes the cautions for use of the safety programmable controller.
CHAPTER 5	Describes a safety application example (when a single safety
	programmable controller is used).
CHAPTER 6	Describes a safety application example (when several safety
	programmable controllers are used).

For the detailed specifications and functions of each module, refer to the related manuals.

#### **GENERIC TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS**

Unless otherwise specified, this manual uses the following generic terms and abbreviations. When a clear indication of target model name is required, the module name is indicated.

Generic term/	Description
abbreviation	
GX Developer	Generic product name for models SWnD5C-GPPW, SWnD5C-GPPW-A, SWnD5C-GPPW-V,
	and SWnD5C-GPPW-VA
RWr	Remote register (Read area for CC-Link Safety and CC-Link IE Field Network)
RWw	Remote register (Write area for CC-Link Safety and CC-Link IE Field Network)
RX	Remote input (for CC-Link Safety and CC-Link IE Field Network)
RY	Remote output (for CC-Link Safety and CC-Link IE Field Network)
SB	Link special relay (for CC-Link Safety and CC-Link IE Field Network)
SW	Link special register (for CC-Link Safety and CC-Link IE Field Network)
Safety master station on	Station that controls CC-Link Safety.
CC-Link Safety	One station is required in a system.
Pomoto station	Generic term for a safety remote I/O station, a standard remote I/O station, and a remote device
	station on CC-Link Safety. This station is controlled by the safety master station on CC-Link
CC-Link Safety	Safety.
Safety remote I/O station	Remote station on CC-Link Safety, which exchanges only bit data.
on CC-Link Safety	Compatible with the safety-related system.
Standard remote I/O	Remote station on CC-Link Safety, which exchanges only bit data.
station on CC-Link Safety	Not compatible with the safety-related system.
Remote I/O station on	Generic term for a safety remote I/O station and a standard remote I/O station on CC-I ink
CC-Link Safety	Safety
Remote device station on	Remote station on CC-Link Safety, which exchanges bit data and word data
CC-I ink Safety	Not compatible with the safety-related system
Safety station on CC-Link	
Safety	Generic term for stations on CC-Link Safety, which perform safety communication
ouncey	Station that controls the entire CC-Link IE Field Network. Only one station can be used in a
Master station (acfet)	
station) on CC Link IF	This station can perform evolis transmission and transient transmission with all stations as
Field Network	CC Link IE Field Network. The station and transmission transmission with all stations on
	CO-LINK IE FIELD INELWORK. The station can also perform safety communication with another
	salely station on the same network.
Local station (safety	I runs station can perform cyclic transmission and transient transmission with the master station
station) on CC-Link IF	and other local stations on CC-Link IE Field Network. The station can also perform safety
Field Network	communication with another safety station on the same network. The station is controlled by
	programs in the CPU module or other equivalent modules on the station.
Slave station on CC-Link	Generic term for stations other than a master station on CC-Link IE Field Network: local station,
IE Field Network	remote I/O station, remote device station, and intelligent device station
Safety station on CC-Link	Generic term for stations on CC-Link IE Field Network, which perform safety communication
IE Field Network	and standard communication
CC-Link Safety master	Abbreviation for the OSO 161PT12 CC link Safety system master medule
module	ADDIEVIATION THE GOUJO TET 12 CO-IIIIK GAIELY SYSTEM MASTER MODULE
CC-Link Safety remote I/O	Abbreviation for the QS0J65BTS2-8D, QS0J65BTS2-4T and QS0J65BTB2-12DT CC-Link
module	Safety system remote I/O module
CC-Link IE Field Network	
master/local module (with	Abbreviation for the QS0J71GF11-T2 CC-Link IE Field Network master/local module
safety functions)	
Safety main base unit	Abbreviation for the QS034B(-E) type safety main base unit

Generic term/ abbreviation	Description			
Safety CPU module	Abbreviation for the QS001CPU type safety CPU module			
Safety power supply	Abbroviation for the OS061P A1 and OS061P A2 type safety power supply modules			
module	Abbievration for the QOUGTE-AT and QOUGTE-AZ type safety power supply modules			
Safaty programmable	Generic term for a safety CPU module, a safety power supply module, a safety main base unit,			
	a CC-Link Safety master module, CC-Link Safety remote I/O modules, and a CC-Link IE Field			
controller	Network master/local module (with safety functions)			
Standard programmable	Generic term for MELSEC-Q series, MELSEC-L series, MELSEC-QnA series, MELSEC-A			
	series, and MELSEC-FX series modules (This term is used to distinguish a programmable			
controller	controller that uses these modules from a safety programmable controller.)			
Sofoty input	Generic term for the signals that are input to the safety programmable controller for realizing the			
Salety Input	safety functions			
Sofoty output	Generic term for the signals that are output from the safety programmable controller for realizing			
Salety output	the safety functions			
Safety communication	Function to exchange safety data between safety stations on the same network			
Safety application	Generic term for the applications that are operated using the safety programmable controller for			
Salety application	realizing the safety functions			

#### TERMINOLOGY

Term	Description			
Safety component	Equipment such as the safety compatible sensor and actuator			
Safety-related system	System executing a safety functions to be required			
Safety functions	Functions to be realized for protecting a human from machinery hazards			
Safety measure	Measure for reducing the risk			
Category	Safety level standardized in EN954-1. The safety level is classified into 5 levels of B and 1 to 4.			
PL (performance level)	Safety level specified in ISO13849-1:2015. The safety level is classified into five levels of "a" to "e".			
SIL	Safety level which is standardized in IEC61508. The safety level is classified into 4 levels of SIL1 to SIL4.			
Diek	Degree of hazards, which is the combination of the occurrence probability and degree of an injury			
risk	and a health problem			
Risk assessment	To clarify hazards in machinery and assess the degree of the hazards			
Link ID	Unique network identifier which is given to each network of the CC-Link Safety			
Target failure measure	Target value of reliability for each SIL level standardized in IEC61508. There are PFD and PFH			
larger landre measure	depending on the operation frequency of the safety functions.			
NC	Abbreviation for normal close contact which is normally closed, but opened when a switch or other			
NO	function is operated			
NO	Abbreviation for normal open contact which is normally opened, but closed when a switch or other			
NO	function is operated			
Close contact	Same as NC			
Open contact	Same as NO			
Dark tost	Outputs a pulse to turn off the input/output when it is on, and performs the failure diagnostics to			
Dark lest	contacts including external equipment			

## CHAPTER 1 OVERVIEW

This chapter describes the overview of the safety programmable controller. The safety programmable controller has acquired certification of the highest safety level (SIL3 of IEC 61508, Category 4 of EN 654-1, and Category 4 performance level "e" of EN ISO 13849-1) applicable to programmable controllers.

The safety programmable controller can be used to construct a safety system meeting requirements of these safety standards.

The system configuration diagram of the safety programmable controller is shown in Figure 1.1.

- Mount a safety power supply module, a safety CPU module, and a CC-Link Safety master module on the safety main base unit.
- Connect the CC-Link Safety master module and a CC-Link Safety remote I/O module to a network.
- When performing safety communication, mount a CC-Link IE Field Network master/ local module (with safety functions) on the safety main base unit, and connect it to a network.
- Connect a personal computer with GX Developer installed to the safety CPU module via USB when setting programs and parameters.

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Figure 1.1 System configuration of safety programmable controller

- \* 1 : The available functions vary depending on the version. For details, refer to the following. CF QSCPU User's Manual (Function Explanation, Program Fundamentals)
- \* 2 : For details on a CC-Link IE Field Network master/local module (with safety functions), refer to the following.
  - MELSEC-QS CC-Link IE Field Network Master/Local Module User's Manual

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## CHAPTER 2 APPLICATION EXAMPLE

(1) When performing safety control for the entire line using a single safety programmable controller

The application image for the car welding line is shown as an application example of the safety programmable controller in Figure 2.1.

A safety application operated by the safety programmable controller is configured for the following purposes:

- When safety is ensured using the safe state signal, power is supplied to robots.
- When safety is not ensured using the safe state signal, the power is cut off.
- The safe state signal can be checked using an emergency stop switch or a light curtain.

The safety programmable controller operates as follows:

- Connect a safe state signal to the CC-Link Safety remote I/O module.
- The CC-Link Safety remote I/O module sends the safe state signal to the safety CPU module. The safety CPU module processes the received signal in the sequence program, and sends a safety output to the CC-Link Safety remote I/O module.
- The safety output cuts off the power to the robots.



Figure 2.1 Safety control for the entire line using a single safety programmable controller

(2) When performing safety control for the entire line using several safety programmable controllers

Figure 2.2 shows an application of safety control interfacing with control processes.

A safety application operated by safety programmable controllers is configured for the following purposes:

- When safety is ensured using the safe state signal, power is supplied to robots.
- When safety is not ensured using the safe state signal, the power is cut off.
- · The safe state signal can be checked using an emergency stop switch or a light curtain.
- Using safety communication, safety programmable controllers on CC-Link IE Field Network can perform safety control interfacing some processes or the entire process.

The safety programmable controller in each process operates as follows:

- · Connect a safe state signal to the CC-Link Safety remote I/O module.
- Connect safety programmable controllers in all processes through CC-Link IE Field Network.
- · The CC-Link Safety remote I/O module sends the safety state signal to the safety CPU module.
- · To perform emergency stop for consecutive processes or the entire line, perform safety communication in CC-Link IE Field Network using sequence program. An emergency stop request is sent to the safety programmable controllers in the consecutive processes or in the entire line.
- The safety CPU module processes the safe state signal received from the CC-Link Safety remote I/O module and an emergency stop request received by safety communication through CC-Link IE Field Network using the sequence program, and sends a safety output to the CC-Link Safety remote I/O module. · The safety output cuts off the power to the robots.



Figure 2.2 Safety control interfacing with control processes

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## CHAPTER 3 RISK ASSESSMENT AND SAFETY LEVEL

Conforming to EN954-1, ISO13849-1, and IEC61508, select the risk assessment, safety category, PL, and SIL to reduce the risk.

This chapter briefly describes the risk assessment, risk reduction and safety category, PL, and SIL.

For details, refer to each standard.

#### 3.1 Risk Assessment

The risk assessment is to clarify hazards in a machine and assess the degree of the hazards.

The risk assessment procedure is shown in Figure 3.1. This procedure is standardized in ISO12100 and 14121.



Figure 3.1 Risk assessment procedure

(Referred to ISO12100.)

3.1.1 Risk reduction

As a result of the risk assessment, when the machinery is judged as unsafe, the risk reduction must be performed.

The measures for the risk reduction are standardized in ISO12100 and ISO14121 as shown in Figure 3.2.



Figure 3.2 Risk reduction

(Referred to ISO12100 and 14121.)

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According to the procedure of Figure 3.1, combine and execute the several risk reduction measures until the machine is safe.

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## 3.2 Safety Category

The safety category is standardized in EN954-1. The risk graph to be used for the safety category selection is shown in Figure 3.3.



Figure 3.3 Safety category selection relevant to safety related sections of control system

(Referred to EN954-1.)

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The requirements of standards for the safety category are shown in Table 3.1.

Category <sup>*1</sup>	Summary of requirements	System behavior <sup>*2</sup>	Principles to achieve safety	OVERVI
В	Safety-related parts of control systems and/or their protective equipment, as well as their components, shall be designed, constructed, selected, assembled and combined in accordance with relevant standards so that they can withstand the expected influence.	The occurrence of a fault can lead to loss of the safety function.	Mainly characterized by	C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C
1	Requirements of B shall apply. Well-tried components and well-tried safety principles shall be used.	The occurrence of a fault can lead to loss of the safety function, but the probability of occurrence is lower than for category B.		SSESSMENT AFETY LEVEL
2	Requirements of B and the use of well-tried safety principles shall apply. Safety function shall be checked at suitable intervals by the machine control system.	<ul> <li>The occurrence of a fault can lead to loss of the safety function between the checks.</li> <li>The loss of safety function is detected by the check.</li> </ul>		PROGRAMMABLE A AND SA
3	Requirements of B and the use of well-tried safety principles shall apply. a single fault in any of these parts does not lead to loss of the safety function, and whenever reasonably practicable the single fault is detected.	<ul> <li>When a single fault occurs, the safety function is always performed.</li> <li>Some but not all faults will be detected.</li> <li>Accumulation of undetected faults can lead to loss of the safety function.</li> </ul>	Mainly characterized by structure	SHETYAPPLCATION CONFIGURATION EXAMPLE CONFIGURATION EXAMPLE BOGGRAMMABLE CONFIGUREN CONFIGURATION BOGGRAMMABLE CONFIGUREN CONFIGURATION
4	<ul> <li>Requirements of B and the use of well-tried safety principles shall apply.</li> <li> a single fault in any of these parts does not lead to loss of the safety function, and</li> <li> the single fault is detected at or before the next demand upon the safety function. If this is not possible, then an accumulation of faults shall not lead to loss of the safety function.</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>When the faults occur the safety function is always performed.</li> <li>The faults will be detected in time to prevent loss of the safety function.</li> </ul>		SAFETY APPLICATION SONFIGURATION EXAMPLE CONFIGURATION EXAMPLE PROGRAMMABLE CONFIGULERS

<b>Fahla</b>	31	Summary	/ of	eafoty	category	/ roquiroments
abie	<b>U</b> . I	Guillina	, 01	Jaioty	category	requirementa

\* 1: The categories are not intended to be used in any given order or in any given hierarchy in respect of safety requirements.

\* 2: The risk assessment will indicate whether the total or partial loss of the safety function(s) arising from faults is acceptable.

(Referred to EN954-1.)

#### 3.3 PL

The PL is specified in ISO13849-1.

Determine a required performance level (PLr). The PLr refers to a performance level required for safety functions to achieve required risk reduction. Figure 3.4 is a risk graph used to determine a PLr.



(Referred to ISO13849-1.)

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Figure 3.5 shows relationship between Category, DCavg (average diagnostic coverage), and MTTFd (mean time to dangerous failure) of each channel and the resulting PL.





#### Refer to the following summary of safety category requirements.

Table 3.2 MTTFd (mean time to dangerous failure)

Level	Range
Low	3 years≦ MTTFd $<$ 10 years
Medium	10 years $\leq$ MTTFd $<$ 30 years
High	30 years $\leq$ MTTFd $\leq$ 100 years

Level	Range
None	DCavg <60%
Low	60%≦ DCavg <90%
Medium	90%≦ DCavg <99%
High	99%≦ DCavg

The PL of a safety-related part in control system must be higher than or equal to the PLr of the safety function.

 $\mathsf{PL} \ge \mathsf{PLr}$ 

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3.3 PL

#### 3.4 SIL

#### SIL is standardized in IEC61508.

The risk graph to be used for the SIL selection is shown in Figure 3.6.



#### Definition of symbols:

Symbol	Definition		
—, а	No safety requirements. Not sufficient with a single safety-related system.		
b			
1,2,3,4	Safety integrity level		
	Stands for SIL1, SIL2, SIL3 and SIL4 respectively.		

Figure 3.6 SIL risk graph

(Referred to IEC61508-5.)

In SIL, the following target failure measure is defined according to the level.

SIL	Low demand mode of operation*1	High demand mode of operation <sup>*1</sup>			
4	$10^{-5} \leq \text{PFD} < 10^{-4}$	$10^{-9} \leq \text{PFH} < 10^{-8}$			
3	$10^{-4} \leq \text{PFD} < 10^{-3}$	$10^{-8} \leq \text{PFH} < 10^{-7}$			
2	$10^{-3} \leq \text{PFD} < 10^{-2}$	$10^{-7} \leq \text{PFH} < 10^{-6}$			
1	$10^{-2} \leq PFD < 10^{-1}$	$10^{-6} \le \text{PFH} < 10^{-5}$			

Table 3.4 Target failure measure (PFD,PFH)

\* 1: For the low and high demand modes of operation, refer to IEC61508.

(Referred to IEC61508-1.)

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## CHAPTER 4 PRECAUTIONS FOR USE OF SAFETY PROGRAMMABLE CONTROLLER

The safety standards conformance approval must be made by the user for the entire safety-related system.

The safety system inspection is made for the entire safety-related system including safety components and a sequence program.

The sample program is shown in CHAPTER 5 and CHAPTER 6. However, the safety standards approval is not obtained.

And all work for safety-related system construction (e.g. design, installation, operation, maintenance) has to be handled by the person who has an enough education concerning safety standards, safety devices, and safety programmable controller.

## 4.1 Precautions for Designing Safety Application

(1) Response time

The response time is a time from the safety input off to the safety output off using the safety programmable controller.

The response time is needed for determining the safety distance for a safety-related system.

Calculate the response time of a system to be configured with referring to Appendix 1 and Appendix 2.

### 

For the safety programmable controller, connecting GX Developer makes the response time longer. Do not constantly connect GX Developer during the safety-related system operation.

(2) Target failure measure (PFD/PFH) calculation Target failure measure (PFD/PFH) is the target value of reliability for each SIL level standardized in IEC61508.( Section 3.4) Calculate the target failure measure (PFD/PFH) with the following formula for each safety function.

$ FFD/FFT - A + D + C + D \cdots Calculation ioninula of FFD/FFT$
---

Table 4.1 Definition of each variable				
Variable	Definition			
	PFD/PFH of safety CPU module, safety power supply module, safety main base unit, CC-			
A	Link Safety master module, and CC-Link IE Field Network master/local module (with safety			
	functions)			
В	PFD/PFH of the CC-Link Safety remote I/O module			
	(1) The safety input device and safety output device are connected to the same CC-Link			
	Safety remote I/O module: B = B1			
	(2) The safety input device and safety output device are connected to the different CC-			
	Link Safety remote I/O modules: B = B1 + B2			
B1	PFD/PFH of the CC-Link Safety remote I/O module to which the safety input device is			
	connected			

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Variable	Definition
B2	PFD/PFH of the CC-Link Safety remote I/O module to which the safety output device is
	connected
C*1	PFD/PFH of safety input equipment
D*1	PFD/PFH of safety output equipment

\* 1: For PFD/PFH of C and D, refer to the manuals, etc. of the used safety components.

PFD/PFH of the safety programmable controller is listed in Table 4.2.

Table 4.2 PFD/PFH of safety programmable controller

	PFD	PFH				
PFD/PFH of safety CPU module	4.10 × 10 <sup>-5 *2</sup>	9.20 × 10 <sup>-10 *2</sup>				
PFD/PFH of safety power supply	QS061P-A1	8.75 × 10 <sup>-5 *3</sup>	3.85 × 10 <sup>-9 *3</sup>			
module	QS061P-A2	8.75 × 10 <sup>-5 *4</sup>	3.85 × 10 <sup>-9 *4</sup>			
PFD/PFH of safety main base unit	-	-				
PFD/PFH of CC-Link Safety master	-	-				
	QS0J65BTB2-12DT (DC input	2 57 × 10-5	1 15 × 10-9			
PFD/PFH of CC-Link Safety	transistor output combined module)	2.57 × 10*	1.15 × 10*			
remote I/O module	QS0J65BTS2-8D (DC input module)	1.68 × 10⁻⁵	7.46 × 10 <sup>-10</sup>			
	QS0J65BTS2-4T (transistor output module)	1.68 × 10 <sup>-5</sup>	7.46 × 10 <sup>-10</sup>			
PFD/PFH of CC-Link IE Field Netv						
functions) <sup>*1</sup>	_	_				

\* 1: PFD and PFH are not required for the following modules:

- Safety main base unit
- CC-Link Safety master module
- CC-Link IE Field Network master/local module (with safety functions)
- \* 2: For the safety CPU module with the serial number "12□□□3" or earlier (first six digits), the PFD and PFH values are as follows: PFD = 5.22 × 10<sup>-5</sup> and PFH = 1.15 × 10<sup>-9</sup>. (□□□ contains any figure.)
- \* 3: For the QS061P-A1 with the serial number "12 $\Box\Box\Box$ 5" or earlier (first six digits), the PFD and PFH values are as follows: PFD = 8.67 × 10<sup>-5</sup> and PFH = 3.80 × 10<sup>-9</sup>. ( $\Box\Box\Box$  contains any figure.)
- \* 4: For the QS061P-A2 with the serial number "12□□□9" or earlier (first six digits), the PFD and PFH
  - values are as follows: PFD = 8.67  $\times$  10<sup>-5</sup> and PFH = 3.80  $\times$  10<sup>-9</sup>. (DDD contains any figure.)



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#### (a) When using one QS0J65BTB2-12DT

- $\mathsf{PFD} = (\mathsf{PFD of A}) + (\mathsf{PFD of B}) + (\mathsf{PFD of C}) + (\mathsf{PFD of D})$ 
  - =  $(4.10 \times 10^{-5} + 8.75 \times 10^{-5}) + (2.57 \times 10^{-5}) + (PFD \text{ of } C) + (PFD \text{ of } D)$
  - =  $(1.54 \times 10^{-4}) + (PFD of C) + (PFD of D)$
- PFH = (PFH of A) + (PFH of B) + (PFH of C) + (PFH of D)
  - =  $(9.20 \times 10^{-10} + 3.85 \times 10^{-9}) + (1.15 \times 10^{-9}) + (PFH of C) + (PFH of D)$ 
    - =  $(5.92 \times 10^{-9})$  + (PFH of C) + (PFH of D)



Figure 4.1 Example when one QS0J65BTB2-12DT is used

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#### (b) When using one QS0J65BTS2-8D and one QS0J65BTS2-4T

- PFD = (PFD of A) + (PFD of B) + (PFD of C) + (PFD of D)
  - =  $(4.10 \times 10^{-5} + 8.75 \times 10^{-5}) + (1.68 \times 10^{-5} + 1.68 \times 10^{-5}) + (PFD of C) + (PFD of D)$
  - =  $(1.62 \times 10^{-4})$  + (PFD of C) + (PFD of D)
- PFH = (PFH of A) + (PFH of B) + (PFH of C) + (PFH of D)
  - =  $(9.20 \times 10^{-10} + 3.85 \times 10^{-9}) + (7.46 \times 10^{-10} + 7.46 \times 10^{-10}) + (PFH of C) + (PFH of D)$ =  $(6.26 \times 10^{-9}) + (PFH of C) + (PFH of D)$



Figure 4.2 Example when one QS0J65BTS2-8D and one QS0J65BTS2-4T are used

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#### (c) When using CC-Link IE Field Network between safety programmable controllers

- PFD = (PFD of input side A) + (PFD of input side B) + (PFD of C) + (PFD of output side A) + (PFD of output side B) + (PFD of D)
  - =  $(4.10 \times 10^{-5} + 8.75 \times 10^{-5}) + (2.57 \times 10^{-5}) + (PFD \text{ of C}) + (4.10 \times 10^{-5} + 8.75 \times 10^{-5}) + (2.57 \times 10^{-5}) + (PFD \text{ of D})$
  - =  $(3.08 \times 10^{-4})$  + (PFD of C) + (PFD of D)
- PFH = (PFH of input side A) + (PFH of input side B) + (PFH of C) + (PFH of output side A) + (PFH of output side B) + (PFH of D)
  - $= (9.20 \times 10^{-10} + 3.85 \times 10^{-9}) + (1.15 \times 10^{-9}) + (PFH \text{ of } \text{C}) + (9.20 \times 10^{-10} + 3.85 \times 10^{-9})$
  - + (1.15 × 10<sup>-9</sup>) + (PFH of D)
  - =  $(1.18 \times 10^{-8})$  + (PFH of C) + (PFH of D)





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#### PRECAUTIONS FOR USE OF SAFETY PROGRAMMABLE CONTROLLER

- (d) When using CC-Link IE Field Network between safety programmable controllers (multiple output points)
  - PFD = (PFD of A1) + (PFD of B1) + (PFD of C1) + (PFD of D1)
    - + (PFD of A2) + (PFD of B2) + (PFD of D2)
    - = (4.10  $\times$  10<sup>-5</sup> + 8.75  $\times$  10<sup>-5</sup>) + (2.57  $\times$  10<sup>-5</sup>) + (PFD of C1) + (PFD of D1)
    - + (4.10 ×  $10^{-5}$  + 8.75 ×  $10^{-5}$ ) + (2.57 ×  $10^{-5}$ ) + (PFD of D2)
    - =  $(3.08 \times 10^{-4})$  + (PFD of C1) + (PFD of D1) + (PFD of D2)
  - PFH = (PFH of A1) + (PFH of B1) + (PFH of C1) + (PFH of D1) + (PFH of A2) + (PFH of B2) + (PFH of D2)
    - =  $(9.20 \times 10^{-10} + 3.85 \times 10^{-9}) + (1.15 \times 10^{-9}) + (PFH \text{ of } C1) + (PFH \text{ of } D1)$
    - + (9.20 ×  $10^{-10}$  + 3.85 ×  $10^{-9}$ ) + (1.15 ×  $10^{-9}$ ) + (PFH of D2)
    - =  $(1.18 \times 10^{-8})$  + (PFH of C1) + (PFH of D1) + (PFH of D2)




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### (3) Connecting safety components

Connect safety components according to the safety level by dual wiring and single wiring as shown in Figure 4.5.





### 

Use the doubling input signal to the CC-Link Safety remote I/O module with the following combinations of input terminals.

For combinations other than the followings, an error is detected by doubling input discrepancy detection.

{X00, X01}, {X02, X03}, {X04, X05}, {X06, X07}

X08, X09, X0A, X0B, X0C, X0D, X0E, X0F

To execute the Input dark test function, connect the safety components using a test pulse terminal.

### 

To execute the Input dark test function, use the test pulse terminals and input terminals of the CC-Link Safety remote I/O module with the following combinations. Connecting to the incorrect test pulse terminal is identified as a wire break and causes an error. Correct combination {X00, X02, X04, X06, X08, X0A, X0C, X0E} and T0 {X01, X03, X05, X07, X09, X0B, X0D, X0F} and T1

When not performing input dark test, the COM+ terminal can be used.

For wiring and setting methods, refer to CHAPTER 5 and CHAPTER 6. For details on dual wiring, single wiring, and input dark test, refer to the following.

(4) Using the monitor data of GX Developer

The monitor data of GX Developer should not be used for the operation related to the safety.

(For example, the operations for the safety such as starting a machine or resetting the stop status should not be performed with checking the monitor data of GX Developer.)

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# 4.2 Precautions for Programming

(1) Basic programming

Configure a program for realizing safety functions with attention to the following points.

- Program so that a machine is started only when safe state can be confirmed at the time the start switch is pressed.
- Program so that a machine is stopped if the safe state is not confirmed.
- Program so that a machine is started at the fall (on→off) of the signal of the start switch.

The programming can prevent a machine from accidentally starting at the switch failure (such as contact welding, spring damage).

 To inhibit restart without manual operation after safety functions were performed and outputs were turned off, create an interlock program which uses a reset button for restart.



Figure 4.6 Configuration example of safety-related system

For program examples, refer to CHAPTER 5 and CHAPTER 6.

- (2) Devices used in a program for realizing the safety functions Data can be used as safety I/O data are the following safety refresh devices. Use the safety refresh devices to create a program for realizing the safety functions.
  - (a) Safety refresh device
    - Internal device data refreshed by communication with safety remote I/O stations on CC-Link Safety

Safety data is refreshed by communication with safety remote I/O stations on CC-Link Safety.



Figure 4.7 I/O data of safety remote I/O stations on CC-Link Safety\*1

 \* 1: Figure 4.7 shows a case where X100 and Y100 are set with the auto refresh parameter. The following device ranges actually not input/output to the safety remote I/O stations on CC-Link Safety are included.

Station No. 1: X110 to X11F, Y110 to Y11F, Station No. 3: X150 to X15F, Y150 to Y15F

• Device data transferred between safety stations on CC-Link IE Field Network Safety data are transferred between safety stations on CC-Link IE Field Network.

For details, refer to the MELSEC-QS CC-Link IE Field Network Master/Local Module User's Manual.

(b) Special relay (SM), special register (SD)

Only the following devices can be used in a program that can perform safety functions.

- CC-Link Safety-related devices, SM1000 to SM1299 and SD1000 to SD1299
- CC-Link IE Field Network-related devices, SM1400 to SM1799 and SD1400 to SD1799

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(3) Detecting errors in CC-Link Safety

Errors occurred in CC-Link Safety can be detected using safety refresh communication status shown in Table 4.3.

Create a program using safety refresh communication status, which turns off safety outputs in case of an error.

(a) Safety refresh communication status
 Table 4.3 shows special registers to check safety refresh communication status.

			Description						
		Description of bits of the following table							
Name	No.	0: Norma	al commu	nication,	reserved	station, u	unused st	tation, sta	ndard
		remot	e station o	on CC-Lir	nk Safety				
		1: Safety	y station c	ommunio	cation err	or			
		_							
Safety refresh communication				b15	b14	to	b1	b0	L
status of each safety remote	SD1004		SD1004	16	15	to	2	1	l
	to		SD1005	32	31	to	18	17	l
Station	SD1007		SD1006	48	47	to	34	33	l
(CC-Link Salety master module 1)			SD1007	64	63	to	50	49	l
			1 to 6	64 in the ta	able indica	ate the sta	tion numb	ers.	
Safety refresh communication				b15	b14	to	b1	b0	l
status of each safety remote	SD1204		SD1204	16	15	to	2	1	l
status of each safety remote	to		SD1205	32	31	to	18	17	l
SidilOII	SD1207		SD1206	48	47	to	34	33	I
(CC-LINK Safety master module 2			SD1207	64	63	to	50	49	l
			1 to 6	64 in the ta	able indica	ate the sta	tion numb	ers.	

#### Table 4.3 Special register names and numbers

For details, refer to the following.

CF QSCPU User's Manual (Function Explanation, Program Fundamentals)

(b) Program example

The program for handling the error detection of CC-Link Safety is shown in Figure 4.8.

Figure 4.8 shows the program used when outputting from the safety remote I/O station of station No.1 on CC-Link Safety connected to the first module of the CC-Link Safety master module using SD1004.0.





### (4) Resetting error status of CC-Link Safety

If an error occurs in CC-Link Safety, the safety station interlock status shown in Table 4.4 turns on.

To restart communication on CC-Link Safety, turn on the safety station interlock cancel request.

Create a program in which an safety station interlock cancel request is manually turned on (e.g. reset button).

Name	No.	Defir	nition for bi	its specia	l register	(Safety s	station int	erlock st	atus)	
			0: Does no	t interlock	ed.					
			1: During i	nterlock						
	SD1072			b15	b14	to	b1	b0	1	
Safety station interlock status	5D1072		SD1072	16	15	to	2	1		
(CC-Link Safety master module 1)	SD1075		SD1073	32	31	to	18	17		
			SD1074	48	47	to	34	33		
			SD1075	64	63	to	50	49		
			1 to 6	4 in the ta	able indica	ite the sta	tion numb	ers.		
			0: I/O inter	lock of sa	fety statio	n on CC-L	ink Safety	not relea	sed	
	SD1076 to SD1079		1: I/O inter	lock of sa	fety statio	n on CC-L	ink Safety.	released		
Safety station interlock cancel request (CC-Link Safety master module 1)				b15	b14	to	b1	b0		
			SD1076	16	15	to	2	1		
			SD1077	32	31	to	18	17		
			SD1078	48	47	to	34	33		
			SD1079	64	63	to	50	49		
			1 to 64 in the table indicate the station numbers.							
		0: Does not interlocked.								
		1: During interlock							_	
	SD1272			b15	b14	to	b1	b0		
Safety station interlock status	to		SD1272	16	15	to	2	1		
(CC-Link Safety master module 2)	SD1275		SD1273	32	31	to	18	17		
	001210		SD1274	48	47	to	34	33		
			SD1275	64	63	to	50	49		
			1 to 6	4 in the ta	able indica	ite the sta	tion numb	ers.		
			0: I/O inter	lock of sa	fety statio	n on CC-L	ink Safety	not relea	sed	
			1: I/O inter	lock of sa	fety statio	n on CC-L	ink Safety	released	1	
Safety station interlock cancel	SD1276			b15	b14	to	b1	b0		
request	to		SD1276	16	15	to	2	1		
(CC-Link Safety master module 2)	SD1279		SD1277	32	31	to	18	17		
			SD1278	48	47	to	34	33		
			SD1279	64	63	to	50	49	ļ	
			1 to 64 in the table indicate the station numbers.							

#### Table 4.4 Special register names and numbers

For details, refer to the following.

CF QSCPU User's Manual (Function Explanation, Program Fundamentals)

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(a) Program example

Figure 4.9 shows the program when the interlock for the safety remote I/O station of station No. 1 on CC-Link Safety, connected to the first CC-Link Safety master module is cleared.



Figure 4.9 Program example to release interlock of CC-LInk Safety

(5) Detecting errors in CC-Link IE Field Network

Errors occurred in CC-Link IE Field Network can be detected using safety refresh communication status shown in Table 4.5.

Create a program using safety refresh communication status, which turns off safety outputs in case of an error.

(a) Safety refresh communication status

Table 4.5 shows the special relay and special registers to check the status of safety refresh communication between the own station and safety stations.

Table 4.	5 Names	and numbers	of the	special	relav a	nd special	registers
	o names	and numbers	or the	special	i ciay a	ina speciai	registers

Name	No.	Description									
Safety refresh communication		0: Normal or safety communication with master station on CC-Link IE Field									
status of safety master station	SM1421	Network not	set								
status of safety master station		1: Safety ref	resh comm	unication	error						
		Description of	of bits of the	e following	table						
		0: Normal co	mmunicatio	on, reserve	ed station,	unused st	ation, stai	ndard station			
		on CC-Link I	E Field Net	work, or c	own statior	ר					
		1: Communication error of safety station on CC-Link IE Field Network									
			b15	to	b8	b7	to	b0			
		SD1420	16	to	9	8	to	1			
Safety refresh communication	SD1420 to	SD1421	32	to	25	24	to	17			
status of each safety station	SD1427	SD1422	48	to	41	40	to	33			
		SD1423	64	to	57	56	to	49			
		SD1424	80	to	73	72	to	65			
		SD1425	96	to	89	88	to	81			
		SD1426	112	to	105	104	to	97			
		SD1427	-	to	-	120	to	113			
			1 to 120	in the tab	le indicate	station nu	imbers.				
				-:	Fixed to "C	)".					

For details, refer to the following.

CF QSCPU User's Manual (Function Explanation, Program Fundamentals)

### (b) Program example

• When communicating with station No. 0

Figure 4.10 shows the program that handles an error occurred in CC-Link IE Field Network during communication with station No. 0.

Status of safety refresh communication with station No. 0 can be checked using SM1421, and the information is output to station No. 0.



Figure 4.10 Example of the program that handles an error occurred in CC-Link IE Field Network during communication with station No. 0

• When communicating with any of station No. 1 to station No. 120

Figure 4.11 shows the program that handles an error occurred in CC-Link IE Field Network during communication with any of station No. 1 to station No. 120.

Status of safety refresh communication with station No. 1 can be checked using SD1420.0, and the information is output to station No. 1.



Figure 4.11 Example of the program that handles an error occurred in CC-Link IE Field Network during communication with any of station No. 1 to station No. 120

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(6) Resetting error status of CC-Link IE Field Network If an error occurs in CC-Link IE Field Network, the safety station interlock status shown in Table 4.6 turns on.

To restart communication on CC-Link IE Field Network, turn on the safety station interlock release request.

Create a program in which an safety station interlock release request is manually turned on (e.g. reset button).

Name	Number	Description										
Safety master station interlock	0144700	0: I	Not interloc	ked								
status	SM1700	1:	1: Interlocked									
		0:	Not interloc	ked								
		1:	nterlocked									
				b15	to	b8	b7	to	b0			
			SD1700	16	to	9	8	to	1			
			SD1701	32	to	25	24	to	17			
	SD1700 to		SD1702	48	to	41	40	to	33			
Salety station interiock status	SD1707		SD1703	64	to	57	56	to	49			
			SD1704	80	to	73	72	to	65			
			SD1705	96	to	89	88	to	81			
			SD1706	112	to	105	104	to	97			
			SD1707	-	to	-	120	to	113			
		1 to 120 in the table indicate station numbers.										
			- Fixed to "0".									
Safety master station interlock	SM1720	0: I/O interlock of safety station on CC-Link IE Field Network not released										
release request	3111720	1:	/O interlock	of safety	station or	n CC-Link	IE Field N	letwork re	eased			
		0:	I/O interloc	k of safety	/ station o	n CC-Link	IE Field N	Network no	ot released			
		1:	/O interlock	of safety	station or	n CC-Link	IE Field N	letwork re	eased			
				b15	to	b8	b7	to	b0			
			SD1720	16	to	9	8	to	1			
			SD1721	32	to	25	24	to	17			
Safety station interlock release	SD1720 to		SD1722	48	to	41	40	to	33			
request	SD1727		SD1723	64	to	57	56	to	49			
			SD1724	80	to	73	72	to	65			
			SD1725	96	to	89	88	to	81			
			SD1726	112	to	105	104	to	97			
			SD1727	-	to	-	120	to	113			
				1 to 120	in the tabl	e indicate	station nu	imbers.				
					-: F	Fixed to "C	)".					

Table 4.6 Names and numbers of special relays and special registers

For details, refer to the following.

CF QSCPU User's Manual (Function Explanation, Program Fundamentals)

- (a) Program example
  - When communicating with station No. 0
    - Figure 4.12 shows the program that releases interlock of CC-Link IE Field Network during communication with station No. 0.
    - Status of safety station interlock with station No. 0 can be checked using SM1700, and safety station interlock for station No. 0 is released.



Figure 4.12 Example of the program that releases interlock of CC-Link IE Field Network during communication with station No. 0

When communicating with any of station No. 1 to station No. 120
 Figure 4.13 shows the program that releases interlock of CC-Link IE Field
 Network during communication with any of station No. 1 to station No. 120.
 Status of safety station interlock with station No. 1 can be checked using
 SD1700.0, and safety station interlock for station No. 1 is released.



Figure 4.13 Example of the program that releases interlock of CC-Link IE Field Network during communication with any of station No. 1 to station No. 120

### (7) Version management of GX Developer project file

Fill in the created date and author at the top of sequence program using the statement function of GX Developer.

When modifying a program, write the date modified, your name, and description of the modification at the modified location using the statement function.

And manage the data which was downloaded to the programmable controller by storing the hard disk of personal computer or CD.





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(8) User registration

Define the user who handles the corresponding project, then register the user information and authorization required for the login authentication in the project. For the user registration, refer to the following.

GX Developer Version 8 Operating Manual (Safety Programmable Controller)

### 4.3 Precautions for Startup

When new safety-related system will be started up or existing safety-related system will be changed, confirm the below points.

(1) Confirmation of network connection configuration

Confirm that the CC-Link Safety remote I/O module used is set as designed. The confirmation items are shown below.

- 1) Link ID
- 2) Station No.
- 3) Transmission speed

For the switch settings of the safety remote I/O station on CC-Link Safety, refer to the following.

CC-Link Safety System Remote I/O Module User's Manual

(2) Confirmation before writing parameters and program

Confirm the parameters and program to be written are as designed before writing them to a programmable controller.

For parameter settings using GX Developer, refer to the following.

GX Developer Version 8 Operating Manual (Safety Programmable Controller) For definitions and setting ranges of parameter settings using GX Developer, refer to the following.

CC-Link Safety System Master Module User's Manual

CF MELSEC-QS CC-Link IE Field Network Master/Local Module User's Manual

(3) Usage of a checklist

Before operation, check if the safety-related system is correctly configured with the checklist in Appendix 3.

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### PRECAUTIONS FOR USE OF SAFETY PROGRAMMABLE CONTROLLER

# 4.4 Precautions for Safety Functions Maintenance

(1) Periodic inspection

To confirm whether the emergency stop switch, safety sensor, etc. are not faulty, execute a periodic inspection every one year for meeting Category 3, every six months for meeting Category 4.

As well as diagnostics of the safety programmable controller, perform a test from the emergency stop

request to machine stop as safety functions.

### (2) Module/unit replacement

For the safety programmable controller, execute the module/unit replacement according to the replacement cycle in Table 4.7.

Table 4.7 Module/unit replacement period							
Module/unit Module/unit replacement cycle							
Safety power supply module	5 years						
Safety CPU module	10 years						
Safety main base unit	10 years						
CC-Link Safety master module	10 years						
CC-Link Safety remote I/O module	5 years						
CC-Link IE Field Network master/local	10 years						
module (with safety functions)	io years						

(3) Safety CPU operation mode while a safety programmable controller is in

operation Set the safety CPU operation mode of the safety programmable controller to SAFETY MODE when the programmable controller is in operation.

- (4) ROM information management of a safety CPU module Confirm the ROM information at regular intervals whether the programs and parameters in the safety CPU module are illegally rewritten.
  - 1) When writing a project file to ROM, check the ROM information using GX Developer, and separately save the information.
  - 2) With reference to the ROM information of GX Developer at regular intervals, confirm whether the information is illegally rewritten.
  - When the information is illegally rewritten, stop the operation. Then, recover the project using the backup project file.

For checking ROM information, refer to the following.

GX Developer Version 8 Operating Manual (Safety Programmable Controller)

(5) Password management

The project files for GX Developer and safety CPU module are protected by password.

Manage the registered password properly and do not leak the password except authorized person in order to prevent the unauthorized access.

# CHAPTER 5 SAFETY APPLICATION CONFIGURATION EXAMPLE (USING A SINGLE SAFETY PROGRAMMABLE CONTROLLER)

This chapter describes a configuration example of a safety application using a single safety programmable controller.

# 5.1 System Configuration

This chapter describes a safety application using the system configuration shown in Figure 5.1.



Figure 5.1 System configuration

	M	Ęl	SE	G	Q	S	series
--	---	----	----	---	---	---	--------

Rema	rk 🛛

In this chapter, the following abbreviations are used for each module.

Abbreviation	Module name
CC master (1)	CC-Link Safety master module (link ID = 0, station number 0)
CC master (2)	CC-Link Safety master module (link ID = 1, station number 0)
CC remote (1)	CC-Link Safety remote I/O module (link ID = 0, station number 1)
CC remote (2)	Standard remote I/O module on CC-Link Safety (station number 2)
CC remote (3)	CC-Link Safety remote I/O module (link ID = 0, station number 3)
CC remote (4)	CC-Link Safety remote I/O module (link ID = 1, station number 1)

# 5.2 Network-Related Switch Settings of Module

Set module switches as described below.

5.2.1 Safety power supply module

The safety power supply module does not have switches.

5.2.2 Safety CPU module

The safety CPU module does not have network-related switches.

5.2.3 CC-Link Safety master module

The CC-Link Safety master module does not have switches.

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### 5.2.4 CC-Link Safety remote I/O module

Set the link ID setting switch, station number setting switch, and transmission speed setting switch.



Figure 5.2 Positions of CC-Link Safety remote I/O module's switches

Table 5.1	Settings	of CC-Link	Safety	remote I/C	) module's	switches

Switch number	Remote I/O module number	CC remote (1) SR_I01	CC remote (3) SR_I03	CC remote (4) SR_I04
1)	Link ID setting switch	0	0	1
2)	Station number setting switch	1	3	1
3)	Transmission speed setting switch	2 (2.5Mbps)	2 (2.5Mbps)	2 (2.5Mbps)

### 

For the procedure to validate the switch settings of the CC-Link Safety remote I/O module, refer to the following.

CC-Link Safety System Remote I/O Module User's Manual

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## 5.3 Parameter Settings of CC-Link Safety

Set the following values to the network parameters.

For descriptions and setting ranges of the parameters, refer to the following.

CC-Link Safety System Master Module User's Manual

Table	52	Setting	example	h م	network	narameters
lable	<b>J.Z</b>	Setting	example	3 01	network	parameters

Module		CC master (1)	CC master (2)
Start I/O No.		0000н	0020н
Operational setting	Case of CPU STOP setting <sup>*1</sup>	Clears compulsorily	Clears compulsorily
Mode		Safety remote net (Ver. 1 mode)	Safety remote net (Ver. 1 mode)
Transmission speed	t	2.5Mbps	2.5Mbps
Safety refresh moni	toring time	50ms	50ms
Safety data monitor	ing time	80ms	80ms
Link ID		0	1
All connect count		3	1
Remote input (RX)		X100	X200
Remote output (RY	)	Y100	Y200
Remote register (RWr)		_	_
Remote register (RWw)		_	_
Special relay (SB)		SB0	SB200
Special relay (SW)		SW0	SW200
Retry count		3	3
Automatic reconnection station count		1	1
Scan mode setting		Synchronous	Synchronous
Station information	Station information	j Section 5.3.1	
setting	Safety remote station	j Section 5.3.2	
Setting	settings		
Remote device station initial setting		None	None

\* 1: Fixed at "Clears compulsorily" when the safety CPU operation mode is set to SAFETY MODE.

### 

Set the link ID and transmission speed values of the network parameter and those of the switches of the connected CC-Link Safety remote I/O module so that they may be the same.

### 5.3.1 Station information setting

Set station information as follows.

			_	
Module	Station No.	Station type	Exclusive station count	Reserve station count
	1/1	Safety remote I/O station	Exclusive station 1	No setting
CC master (1)	2/2	Standard remote I/O station	Exclusive station 1	No setting
	3/3	Safety remote I/O station	Exclusive station 1	No setting
CC master (2)	1/1	Safety remote I/O station	Exclusive station 1	No setting

#### Table 5.3 Example of station information setting

### 5.3.2 Safety remote station settings

Set the safety remote station settings as follows.

#### Table 5.4 Safety remote station settings

Modulo	CC remote (1)	CC remote (3)	CC remote (4)
woulle	SR_IO1	SR_IO3	SR_IO4
Model name	QS0J65BTB2-12DT	QS0J65BTB2-12DT	QS0J65BTB2-12DT
Module technical version <sup>*1</sup>	D	D	D
Specify production	Ves (check)	Yes (check)	Ves (check)
information to find module		Tes (Check)	Tes (check)
Production information <sup>*2</sup>	11000000000001	11000000000003	11000000000002
Parameter	Indicated ir	n each case example of Section	5.6 or later.

 \* 1: Check the module technical version on the rating plate located on the side of the module that is mounted on the corresponding safety remote I/O station on CC-Link Safety.
 Depending on module combination, the station cannot be connected. For details, refer to the following.

CC-Link Safety System Remote I/O Module User's Manual

\* 2: Enter the production information referring to the serial number printed on the rating plate located on the side of the module that is mounted on the corresponding safety remote I/O station on CC-Link Safety. For details, refer to the following.

CC-Link Safety System Remote I/O Module User's Manual

The production information is useful to maintain functions after the module is changed and to detect a setting error such as station number duplication of safety remote I/O stations on CC-Link Safety. Check the production information to use the safety programmable controllers properly and safely.

# SAFETY APPLICATION CONFIGURATION EXAMPLE (USING A SINGLE SAFETY PROGRAMMABLE CONTROLLER)

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# 5.4 Relationship Between Safety CPU Module Devices and Remote Inputs/Outputs

The following shows the relationship between safety CPU module devices and inputs/ outputs of remote I/O stations on CC-Link Safety with the settings described in Table 5.2. Use devices in shaded areas in the sequence program.





6(Inclusion)

## 5.5 Wiring Diagram and Parameter Setting of Standard Input

- CC remote (3) QS0J65BTB2-12DT(3) (Link ID: 0, Station number: 3) COM-DA Reset switch (NO) X0 38 DB DG 3 40 SLD 4 X1 7 COM 41 +24V 5 X2 T1 42 Start switch (NO) 6 FG 43 24G 8 Х3 Π COM 24VDC 9 Stop switch (NC) 10 X4 11 Т0 12 X5 13 COM 14 X6 T1 X7 15 16 17 COM 18 COM+ COM Y0-19 44 45 COM-46 Y0-X8 T0 20 21 22 X9 47 COM-23 COM-48 Y1+ XA T1 49 COM-Y1-24 25 50 XB COM 26 51 27 COM-52 Y2-28 XC COM Т0 29 54 Y2-30 XD 55 COM 31 COM 56 Y3+ XE 57 COM-32 33 T1 58 Y3-34 XF 59 COM-COM+ I/024\ 35 60 COM+ 61 I/024G 36 24VDC
- (1) Using the QS0J65BTB2-12DT of module technical version D or later
  - Wiring example of a reset switch, start switch, and stop switch<sup>\*1</sup>

Figure 5.4 CC remote (3) SR\_IO3 standard input wiring

\*1: The switches can be wired to X0, X1, and X2 terminals.

#### · Parameter setting example

Table 5.5 CC remote (3) SR\_IO3 parameter settings

ltem	Option <sup>*3*4</sup>
1. Time of noise removal filter X0, 1 <sup>*1</sup>	"1ms"
2. Time of noise removal filter X2, 3 <sup>*1</sup>	"1ms"
3. Time of noise removal filter X4, 5 <sup>*1</sup>	"1ms"
9. Doubling input discrepancy detection time X0, 1 <sup>*2</sup>	"Do not detect"
10. Doubling input discrepancy detection time X2, $3^{*2}$	"Do not detect"
11. Doubling input discrepancy detection time X4, $5^{*2}$	"Do not detect"
17. Input dark test selection X0, 1	"Not execute"
18. Input dark test selection X2, 3	"Not execute"
19. Input dark test selection X4, 5	"Not execute"
25. Input dark test pulse OFF time <sup>*1</sup>	"400µs"
38. Doubling/single input selection X0, 1	"X0: Single input, X1: No Use"
39. Doubling/single input selection X2, 3	"X2: Single input, X3: No Use"
40. Doubling/single input selection X4, 5	"X4: Single input, X5: No Use"
46. Auto RTN Func to detect doubling input mismatch	"Invalid"

\*1: Adjust the values of Time of noise removal filter and Input dark test pulse OFF time according to the installation environment and wiring length.

\*2: Set Doubling input discrepancy detection time to 100ms for the mechanical switch and 20ms for the sensor input as a standard.

\*3: For setting range, refer to the following.

CC-Link Safety System Remote I/O Module User's Manual

\*4: Always set the enclosed option for this case example.



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(2) Using the QS0J65BTB2-12DT of module technical version C or earlier
 Wiring example of a reset switch, start switch, and stop switch

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Figure 5.5 CC remote (3) SR\_IO3 standard input wiring

• Parameter setting example

Table 5.6 CC remote (3) SR\_IO3 parameter settings

Item	Setting <sup>*3 *4</sup>
1. Time of noise removal filter X0, 1 <sup>*1</sup>	"1ms"
2. Time of noise removal filter X2, 3 <sup>*1</sup>	"1ms"
3. Time of noise removal filter X4, 5 <sup>*1</sup>	"1ms"
9. Doubling input discrepancy detection time X0, 1 <sup>*2</sup>	"100ms"
10. Doubling input discrepancy detection time X2, 3 <sup>*2</sup>	"100ms"
11. Doubling input discrepancy detection time X4, 5 <sup>*2</sup>	"100ms"
17. Input dark test selection X0, 1	"Not execute"
18. Input dark test selection X2, 3	"Not execute"
19. Input dark test selection X4, 5	"Not execute"
25. Input dark test pulse OFF time <sup>*1</sup>	"400 µs"

\*1: Adjust the values of Time of noise removal filter and Input dark test pulse OFF time according to the installation environment and wiring length.

- \*2: Set Doubling input discrepancy detection time to 100ms for the mechanical switch and 20ms for the sensor input as a standard.
- \*3: For setting range, refer to the following.

CC-Link Safety System Remote I/O Module User's Manual

\*4: Always set the enclosed option for this case example.

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## 5.6 Case Examples

### 5.6.1 Emergency stop circuit

(1) Application overview

The emergency stop circuit is the safety application that turns off the power source of a robot with the emergency stop switch.

The application controls the start and stop of a robot by turning on or off the main contact of the contactor which opens and closes the power source of a robot at the safety relay contact.

Connect the emergency stop switch and safety relays to a safety programmable controller.

The safety programmable controller turns on/off the contacts of the safety relays with sequence program.

When the safety programmable controller detects an error by self-diagnostics, outputs to the safety relays turn off independent of the sequence program.

In this case, the outputs remain off until the safety CPU module or CC-Link Safety remote I/O module is reset independent of the sequence program.

Configure the sequence program so that the following functions can be achieved.

- 1) After ensuring safety (The emergency stop signal is on.), activating the reset switch and then the start switch turns on the safety relays.
- 2) When the contacts of the safety relays are welded, do not start the robot. Input the auxiliary relays (normally closed contacts) to the safety programmable controller to check for welding.
- 3) The reset switch and start switch become valid only when turned off to avoid operation at contact welding or short-circuit.
- 4) The safety relay outputs are turned off when the emergency stop switch input is turned off or an error is detected in the safety remote I/O station on CC-Link Safety after the operation is started.



#### Figure 5.6 Emergency stop switch

(Partially quoted from "Safety Guide Book - the safety measures of machinery in the workplace"

: Nippon Electric Control Equipment Industries Association.)



(2) Connection of safety devices

Figure 5.7 Safety device connection diagram

(3) Wiring diagram and parameter settings

Wire the emergency stop switch and safety relays to the CC-Link Safety remote I/O module as follows.



Figure 5.8 CC remote (4) SR\_IO4 wiring

1



For the emergency stop switch and the safety relays, set the parameters as follows. Table 5.7 CC remote (4) SR\_IO4 parameter settings

Item	Setting <sup>*4*5</sup>
2. Time of noise removal filter X2, 3 <sup>*1</sup>	"1ms"
3. Time of noise removal filter X4, 5 <sup>*1</sup>	"1ms"
10. Doubling input discrepancy detection time X2, 3 <sup>*2</sup>	"100ms"
11. Doubling input discrepancy detection time X4, 5 <sup>*2</sup>	"100ms"
18. Input dark test selection X2, 3	"Execute"
19. Input dark test selection X4, 5	"Execute"
25. Input dark test pulse OFF time <sup>*1</sup>	"400µs"
28. Method of wiring of output Y2	"Doubling wiring (Source+Sink)"
32. Output dark test selection Y2	"Execute"
36. Output dark test pulse OFF time Y2*1	"1ms"
39. Doubling/single input selection X2, 3 <sup>*3</sup>	"Doubling input"
40. Doubling/single input selection X4, 5 <sup>*3</sup>	"Doubling input"
46. Auto RTN Func to detect doubling input mismatch*3	"Invalid"

\*1: Adjust the values of Time of noise removal filter, Input dark test pulse OFF time, and Output dark test pulse OFF time according to the installation environment and wiring length.

- \*2: Set Doubling input discrepancy detection time to 100ms for the mechanical switch and 20ms for the sensor input as a standard.
- \*3: The parameter is added to the QS0J65BTB2-12DT of technical version D. When a module of technical version C or earlier is used, the parameter is not available.
- \*4: For setting range, refer to the following.
  - CC-Link Safety System Remote I/O Module User's Manual
- \*5: Always set the enclosed option for this case example.
- (4) Device numbers to be used

The following device numbers are used in the sequence program.

Table 5.8 Device numbers to be used

Safety/Standard	External device	Device number
Safety	Emergency stop switch	X204 or X205
Safety	Safety relay	Y202
Safety	Safety relay (check for welding)	X202 or X203
Standard	Start switch	X142
Standard	Reset switch	X140

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### (5) Sequence program

The sequence program performs the following processing.



#### Figure 5.9 Sequence program

The following shows the constant and internal devices used in the program.

#### (a) Way of using the constant

K□ indicates decimal number. Example) K1 = 1 of decimal number

### (b) Way of using the internal devices

#### Table 5.9 Way of using the internal devices

Internal device	Description
то	Timer device
10	Times out after a lapse of the time specified at K $\Box$ .
	Word device
	Used as restart status in this program.
D0	(1) D0 = 0: Initial status or start processing completed
	(2) D0 = 1 (D0.0: on): Reset switch activated
	(3) D0 = 2 (D0.1: on): Restart processing completed (Reset switch released after activated in (2))
	Word device
	Used as start status in this program.
D1	(1) D1 = 0: Initial status or safety not confirmed
	(2) D1 = 1 (D1.0: on): Start switch activated
	(3) D1 = 2 (D1.1: on): Start processing completed (Start switch released after activated in (2))

### (c) Way of using word device bit specification

 $D \square \square . \square$  indicates the  $\square$  th bit data of word device  $D \square \square$ .

Example) D0.0 = 0 bits in D0



### (6) Timing chart





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### (7) Program using safety FB

Table 5.10 Safety	FBs to be used
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FB name	Function	Description
F+EDM	External device monitor	This FB monitors safety equipment such as
		an actuator and a contactor and controls a
		safety output.
F+ESTOP		This FB is a safety-related FB for monitoring
	C marganey, atom	an emergency stop button. This FB can be
	Emergency stop	used for emergency switch off functionality
		(stop category 0).





For details on the safety FBs, F+ESTOP, and F+EDM, refer to the following.

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### (8) Timing chart

Figure 5.13 Timing chart

Safety relay contact welding detection in this example (The same applies to other examples in this manual.)

F+EDM is a safety FB that checks the contact welding of safety relays or safety contactors connected to the safety outputs of the safety remote I/O station on CC-Link Safety. The safety remote I/O station on CC-Link Safety has the doubling input discrepancy detection function. Therefore, when either contact of a safety relay or a safety contactor is welded, an error is detected both by the safety remote I/O station on CC-Link Safety and by F+EDM.

If either auxiliary relay (normally closed contact) is welded when S\_EDM\_Out (output of F+EDM) turns on, F+EDM does not detect the error while the safety remote I/O station on CC-Link Safety does.

Accordingly, the program is created using the safety station refresh communication status (SD1004 to SD1007 and SD1204 to SD1207) of the safety remote I/O station on CC-Link Safety to which the auxiliary relay (normally closed contact) is connected so that Activate may turn off to turn off the safety output of F+EDM.

(For SD1004 to SD1007 and SD1204 to SD1207, refer to Section 4.2 (3) Detecting errors in CC-Link Safety.)

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### 5.6.2 Door monitor circuit

### (1) Application overview

This application de-energizes a robot with the safety switch on the door of a safety barrier when the door is opened.

The robot cannot be started while the door on the safety barrier is open.

The application controls the start and stop of a robot by turning on or off the main contact of the contactor which opens and closes the power source of a robot at the safety relay contact.

Connect the safety switch and safety relays to a safety programmable controller. The safety programmable controller turns on/off the contacts of the safety relays with sequence program.

When the safety programmable controller detects an error by self-diagnostics, outputs to the safety relays turn off independent of the sequence program.

In this case, the outputs remain off until the safety CPU module or CC-Link Safety remote I/O module is reset independent of the sequence program.

Configure the sequence program so that the following functions can be achieved.

- 1) After ensuring safety (The safety switch is on.), activating the reset switch and then the start switch turns on the safety relays.
- 2) When the contacts of the safety relays are welded, do not start the robot. Input the auxiliary relays (normally closed contacts) to the safety programmable controller to check for welding.
- 3) The reset switch and start switch become valid only when turned off to avoid operation at contact welding or short-circuit.
- 4) When the safety barrier door is opened and the safety switch is turned off or the stop switch is activated, outputs to the safety relays turn off.
- 5) When an error is detected in the safety remote I/O station on CC-Link Safety after operation, outputs to the safety relays turn off.



#### Figure 5.14 Door monitor circuit

(Partially quoted from "Safety Guide Book - the safety measures of machinery in the workplace"

: Nippon Electric Control Equipment Industries Association.)

# **5** SAFETY APPLICATION CONFIGURATION EXAMPLE (USING A SINGLE SAFETY PROGRAMMABLE CONTROLLER)

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Figure 5.15 Safety device connection diagram

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(3) Wiring diagram and parameter settings

### (a) CC remote (1): SR\_IO1

Wire the safety switch to the CC-Link Safety remote I/O module as follows.



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Figure 5.16 CC remote (1) SR\_IO1 wiring



#### For the safety switch, set the parameters as follows.

#### Table 5.11 CC remote (1) SR\_IO1 parameter settings

Item	Setting <sup>*4*5</sup>
1. Time of noise removal filter X0. 1 <sup>*1</sup>	"1ms"
9. Doubling input discrepancy detection time X0, 1 <sup>*2</sup>	"100ms"
17. Input dark test selection X0, 1	"Execute"
25. Input dark test pulse OFF time <sup>*1</sup>	"400µs"
38. Doubling/single input selection X0, 1 <sup>*3</sup>	"Doubling input"
46. Auto RTN Func to detect doubling input mismatch <sup>*3</sup>	"Invalid"

\*1 Adjust the values of Time of noise removal filter and Input dark test pulse OFF time according to the installation environment and wiring length.

\*2: Set Doubling input discrepancy detection time to 100ms for the mechanical switch and 20ms for the sensor input as a standard.

\*3: The parameter is added to the QS0J65BTB2-12DT of technical version D.

When a module of technical version C or earlier is used, the parameter is not available.\*4: For setting range, refer to the following.

CC-Link Safety System Remote I/O Module User's Manual

\*5: Always set the enclosed option for this case example.

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### (b) CC remote (4): SR\_IO4

Wire the relay with forcibly guided (mechanically linked) contacts to the CC-Link Safety remote I/O module as follows.



Figure 5.17 CC remote (4) SR\_IO4 wiring

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For the relay with forcibly guided (mechanically linked) relays, set the parameters as follows.

Table 5.12 CC remote (4) SR\_IO4 parameter settings

Item	Setting <sup>*4*5</sup>
2. Time of noise removal filter X2, 3 <sup>*1</sup>	"1ms"
10. Doubling input discrepancy detection time X2, $3^{*2}$	"100ms"
18. Input dark test selection X2, 3	"Execute"
25. Input dark test pulse OFF time <sup>*1</sup>	"400µs"
28. Method of wiring of output Y2	"Doubling wiring (Source+Sink)"
32. Output dark test selection Y2	"Execute"
36. Output dark test pulse OFF time Y2*1	"1ms"
39. Doubling/single input selection X2, 3 <sup>*3</sup>	"Doubling input"
46. Auto RTN Func to detect doubling input mismatch <sup>*3</sup>	"Invalid"

\*1: Adjust the values of Time of noise removal filter, Input dark test pulse OFF time, and Output dark test pulse OFF time according to the installation environment and wiring length.

\*2: Set Doubling input discrepancy detection time to 100ms for the mechanical switch and 20ms for the sensor input as a standard.

\*3: The parameter is added to the QS0J65BTB2-12DT of technical version D.

When a module of technical version C or earlier is used, the parameter is not available. \*4: For setting range, refer to the following.

CC-Link Safety System Remote I/O Module User's Manual

\*5: Always set the enclosed option for this case example.
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(4) Device numbers to be used

The following device numbers are used in the sequence program.

Table 5.13 Device numbers to be used

Safety/standard External device		Device number
Safety Safety switch		X100 or X101
Safety	Safety relay	Y202
Safety	Safety relay (check for welding)	X202 or X203
Standard	Reset switch	X140
Standard	Start switch	X142
Standard	Stop switch	X144

(5) Sequence program

The sequence program performs the following processing.





The following shows the constant and internal devices used in the program.

(a) Way of using the constant

K□ indicates decimal number.

Example) K1 = 1 of decimal number

### (b) Way of using the internal devices

Table 5.14 Way of using the internal devices

Internal device	Description
то	Timer device
10	Times out after a lapse of the time specified at $K\Box$ .
	Word device
	Used as restart status in this program.
D0	(1) D0 = 0: Initial status or start processing completed
	(2) D0 = 1 (D0.0: on): Reset switch activated
	(3) D0 = 2 (D0.1: on): Restart processing completed (Reset switch released after activated in (2))
	Word device
	Used as start status in this program.
D1	(1) D1 = 0: Initial status or safety not confirmed
	(2) D1 = 1 (D1.0: on): Start switch activated
	(3) D1 = 2 (D1.1: on): Start processing completed (Start switch released after activated in (2))

### (c) Way of using word device bit specification

 $D \square \square .$  indicates the  $\Box$  th bit data of word device  $D \square \square$ .

Example) D0.0 = 0 bits in D0



### (6) Timing chart



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## (7) Program using safety FB

Table 5.15 Safety FBs to be used				
e	Function	Description		
	External device	This FB monitors safety equipment such as an actuator and a contactor and controls a		

F+EDM	External device monitor	an actuator and a contactor and controls a safety output.		
	Guard monitoring	This FB monitors a safety guard using two		
E+CMON		safety switches and dual switch discrepancy		
FTGINION		time (Monitoring Time) when the guard is		
		closed.		



Figure 5.21 Program using safety FB

For details on the safety FBs, F+GMON, and F+EDM, refer to the following.

In this example, the guard status (open or close) is monitored using one safety switch. The input signals of the F+GMON (S\_GuradSwitch1 and S\_GuradSwitch2) are connected to the same signal of the safety switch (X100 or X101).

In addition, the value for the input signal (Discrepancy Time) of the F+GMON is set to 0 so that an error occurs immediately after the doubling input discrepancy is detected between S\_GuradSwitch1 and S\_GuradSwitch2.

(Since S\_GuradSwitch1 and S\_GuradSwitch2 are connected to the same signal, the doubling input discrepancy actually does not occur.)

If two safety switches are used to monitor the guard status, connect the input signals (S\_GuradSwitch1 and S\_GuradSwitch2) to two different signals of the two safety switches. Set the desired allowable discrepancy time between S\_GuradSwitch1 and S\_GuradSwitch2 to Discrepancy Time of the F+GMON using a constant (in increments of 10ms).

(Example: To set five seconds, connect the constant, K500.)



## (8) Timing chart

Figure 5.22 Timing Chart

# 5.6.3 Entering detection and existence detection circuit 1

## (1) Application overview

The entering detection and existence detection circuit is the safety application that detects the entrance and existence of a human in a hazardous area and turns off the power source of a robot.

The entrance of human to the hazardous area is detected with a light shielding of the light curtain. The existence of human in the hazardous area is detected with a laser scanner. When the entrance or existence of human has been detected, a robot is stopped.

The robot cannot be started until the human leaves the hazardous area.

Connect the light curtain, laser scanner, and contactors to a safety programmable controller.

The safety programmable controller turns on/off the main contacts of the contactors with sequence program.

When the safety programmable controller detects an error by self-diagnostics, outputs to the contactors turn off independent of the sequence program.

In this case, the outputs remain off until the safety CPU module or CC-Link Safety remote I/O module is reset independent of the sequence program.

Configure the sequence program so that the following functions can be achieved.

- After ensuring safety (The light curtain and laser scanner signals are both on.), activating the reset switch and then the start switch turns on the contactors.
- 2) When the main contacts of the contactors are welded, do not start the robot. Input the auxiliary contacts (normally closed contacts) to the safety programmable controller to check for welding.
- 3) The reset switch and start switch become valid only when turned off to avoid operation at contact welding or short-circuit.
- 4) The contactor outputs are turned off when the light curtain signal or laser scanner signal is turned off or an error is detected in the safety remote I/ O station on CC-Link Safety after the operation is started.



Figure 5.23 Entering detection and existence detection circuit (Partially quoted from "Safety Guide Book - the safety measures of machinery in the workplace" : Nippon Electric Control Equipment Industries Association.) OVERVIEW

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(2) Connection of safety devices



(3) Wiring diagram and parameter settings

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Wire the light curtain and the laser scanner to the CC-Link Safety remote I/O module

Figure 5.25 CC remote (1) SR\_IO1 wiring

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3. Time of noise removal filter X4, 5<sup>\*1</sup>

11. Doubling input discrepancy detection time X4, 5 <sup>*2</sup>	"20ms"
12. Doubling input discrepancy detection time X6, 7 <sup>*2</sup>	"20ms"
19. Input dark test selection X4, 5	"Not execute"
20. Input dark test selection X6, 7	"Not execute"
25. Input dark test pulse OFF time*1	"400 µs"
40. Doubling/single input selection X4, 5 <sup>*3</sup>	"Doubling input"
41. Doubling/single input selection X6, $7^{*3}$	"Doubling input"

Table 5.16 CC remote (1) SR\_IO1 parameter settings

"1ms"

46. Auto RTN Func to detect doubling input mismatch\*3 "Invalid"

> \*1: Adjust the values of Time of noise removal filter and Input dark test pulse OFF time according to the installation environment and wiring length.

> \*2: Set Doubling input discrepancy detection time to 100ms for the mechanical switch and 20ms for the sensor input as a standard.

\*3: The parameter is added to the QS0J65BTB2-12DT of technical version D.

When a module of technical version C or earlier is used, the parameter is not available. \*4: For setting range, refer to the following.

For the light curtain and the laser scanner, set the parameters as follows.  $\mu$ 

Setting<sup>\*4\*5</sup>

CC-Link Safety System Remote I/O Module User's Manual

\*5: Always set the enclosed option for this case example.



## (b) CC remote (4): SR\_IO4

Wire the contactors to the CC-Link Safety remote I/O module as follows.







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#### For the contactors, set the parameters as follows. Table 5.17 CC remote (4) SR\_IO4 parameter settings

Item	Setting <sup>*4*5</sup>
5. Time of noise removal filter X8, 9 <sup>*1</sup>	"1ms"
13. Doubling input discrepancy detection time X8, $9^{*2}$	"100ms"
21. Input dark test selection X8, 9	"Execute"
25. Input dark test pulse OFF time*1	"400µs"
26. Method of wiring of output Y0	"Doubling wiring (Source+Source)"
27. Method of wiring of output Y1	"Doubling wiring (Source+Source)"
30. Output dark test selection Y0	"Execute"
31. Output dark test selection Y1	"Execute"
34. Output dark test pulse OFF time Y0*1	"1ms"
35. Output dark test pulse OFF time Y1*1	"1ms"
42. Doubling/single input selection X8, 9 <sup>*3</sup>	"Doubling input"
46. Auto RTN Func to detect doubling input mismatch <sup>*3</sup>	"invalid"

\*1: Adjust the values of Time of noise removal filter, Input dark test pulse OFF time, and Output dark test pulse OFF time according to the installation environment and wiring length.

- \*2: Set Doubling input discrepancy detection time to 100ms for the mechanical switch and 20ms for the sensor input as a standard.
- \*3: The parameter is added to the QS0J65BTB2-12DT of technical version D. When a module of technical version C or earlier is used, the parameter is not available.
- \*4: For setting range, refer to the following.
  - CC-Link Safety System Remote I/O Module User's Manual
- \*5: Always set the enclosed option for this case example.

#### (4) Device numbers to be used

#### The following device numbers are used in the sequence program.

#### Table 5.18 Device numbers to be used

Safety/standard External device		Device number	
Safety Light curtain		X104 or X105	
Safety	Laser scanner	X106 or X107	
Safety	Contactor	Y200 and Y201	
Safety	Contactor (check for welding)	X208 or X209	
Standard	Reset switch	X140	
Standard	Start switch	X142	

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## (5) Sequence program

The sequence program performs the following processing.

0	¥200	¥201	x140  ↑	[MOV	К1	DO	3	
5-	⊅0.0 —	x140 — ↓ —	M5	[MOV	к2	DO	3	Ladder which checks the falling edge
			SD1272.0		[SET	SD1276.0		the reset request, and releases the interlock for the CC-Link Safety.
			SD1072.0		[SET	SD1076.0	) ]	
17	sD1272.0 s	3D1276.0			[RST	SD1276.0	) ]	l adder which confirms the interlock released
20-	sp1072.0 s	301076.0			[RST	SD1076.0	) ] j	status and cancels the interlock release request.
23-	DO.1	M5	x142	[MOV	к1	D1	3 ]	
28	⊅1.0 ──┤	м5 —	x142  ↓	[MOV	K2	D1	3	Ladder which checks the falling edge (ON→OFF) of the start switch and accepts the start request.
				[MOV	ко	DO	3	
35-	¥200	¥201	x208			кз (то	>}	Ladder which checks the contact welding in the contactor. T0 is an off delay timer for the contactor.
42	SD1204.0	x104	x106			-(M5	>}	Ladder which checks the status of a robot (whether it is ready to be started or be back to operation).
47	м5 — / / — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —			[MOV	KO	D1	3	I adder which cancels the start or reset request
		DO.1		[MOV	KŪ	DO	эĴ	when safety cannot be confirmed.
53 -	м5 ——	D1.1		 		-(¥200		Ladder which controls an output to the contactor
						-(¥201	5	
57						END	}	

#### Figure 5.27 Sequence program

The following shows the constant and internal devices used in the program.

#### (a) Way of using the constant

K□ indicates decimal number. Example) K1 = 1 of decimal number

### (b) Way of using the internal devices

Table 5.19 Way of using the internal devices

Internal device	Description
то	Timer device
10	Times out after a lapse of the time specified at $K\Box$ .
	Word device
	Used as restart status in this program.
D0	(1) D0 = 0: Initial status or start processing completed
	(2) D0 = 1 (D0.0: on): Reset switch activated
	(3) D0 = 2 (D0.1: on): Restart processing completed (Reset switch released after activated in (2))
	Word device
	Used as start status in this program.
D1	(1) D1 = 0: Initial status or safety not confirmed
	(2) D1 = 1 (D1.0: on): Start switch activated
	(3) D1 = 2 (D1.1: on): Start processing completed (Start switch released after activated in (2))

#### (c) Way of using word device bit specification

 $D \square \square . \square$  indicates the  $\square$ th bit data of word device  $D \square \square$ .

Example) D0.0 = 0 bits in D0



Figure 5.28 Word device bit specification

# SAFETY APPLICATION CONFIGURATION EXAMPLE (USING A SINGLE SAFETY PROGRAMMABLE CONTROLLER)

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Figure 5.29 Timing chart

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(7) Program using safety FB

Table 5.20 Safety FBs to be used

FB name	Function	Description
F+EDM	External device	This FB monitors safety equipment such as
		an actuator and a contactor and controls a
	monitor	safety output.
ELEODE	Light curtain (ESPE)	This FB is used for emergency stop of Stop
FTESFE		Category 0 using a light curtain.

70	X140 SD1072.0		Form		l
/8	SD1272.0		{SEI	SD1076.0	Ladder which releases the interlock when
	SD1072_0_SD1076_0		lset	SD1276.0	communication failure or I/O error occurs on
85			[RST	SD1076.0 ]	CC-Link Safety.
88	SD1272. 0 SD1276. 0		[RST	SD1276.0 ]	
91	M2 X140			—(M3 )	Ladder which converts the Reset input bit of the safety FB, F+EDM.
	M2 X142				
97	sD1004.0 SD1204.0	-B:Activate F+ESPE(FB1) Ready:B	]		
	X104	B:S_ESPE_In S_ESPE_Out:B		—(M1 )	Ladder which monitors the status of the light curtain.
	SM401	B:S_StartReset Error:B			The safety FB is enabled by activating the reset switch after the programmable controller is neuronal on or offer the light outpain is
	SM401	B:S_AutoReset DiagCode:W			blocked and the safety output is turned off.
	X140	- B:Reset			
31	SD1004. 0 SD1204. 0	F+ESPE(FB2) B:Activate Ready:B	]		
	X106	B:S_ESPE_In S_ESPE_Out:B		—(M11 )	Ladder which monitors the status of the laser scanner.
	SM401	B:S_StartReset Error:B			The safety FB is enabled by activating the reset switch after the programmable controller
	SM401	− B:S_AutoReset DiagCode:W			is powered on or after the laser scanner is blocked and the safety output is turned off.
		- B:Reset			
65	SD1204.0 M1 M11	F+EDM(FB3) B:Activate Ready:B	]		
	M1 M11	B:S_OutControl S_EDM_Out:B		—(M4 )	Ladder which monitors the contact welding
	X208	B:S_EDM1 Error:B		(M2 )	in the contactor.
	X209	B:S_EDM2 DiagCode:W			again by activating the start switch after the
	[КЗО	] D:MonitoringTime			Activate the reset switch to clear an error
	SM401	- B:S_StartReset			
	M3	- B:Reset			
214	M4			(Y200 )	Ladder which controls an output to the
				(Y201 )	$\int contactor.$
217				[END ]	

Figure 5.30 Program using safety FB

For details on the safety FBs, F+ESPE, and F+EDM, refer to the following.

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Figure 5.31 Timing chart

APPENDICES

## 5.6.4 Entering detection and existence detection circuit 2

## (1) Application overview

The entering detection and existence detection circuit is the safety application that detects the entrance and existence of a human in a hazardous area and turns off the power source of a robot.

The entrance of human to the hazardous area is detected with a light shielding of the light curtain. The existence of human in the hazardous area is detected with mat switch. When the entrance or existence of human has been detected, a robot is stopped.

The robot cannot be started until the human leaves the hazardous area.

Start and stop of the robot is controlled with contactors that close and open the power supply.

The safety programmable controller turns on/off the main contacts of the contactors with sequence program.

Connect the light curtain and contactors to a safety programmable controller. The relay is connected between the mat switch and safety programmable controller. The safety programmable controller turns on/off the main contacts of the contactors with sequence program.

When the safety programmable controller detects an error by self-diagnostics, outputs to the contactors turn off independent of the sequence program.

In this case, the outputs remain off until the safety CPU module or CC-Link Safety remote I/O module is reset independent of the sequence program.

Configure the sequence program so that the following functions can be achieved.

- 1) After ensuring safety (The light curtain and mat switch signals are both on.), activating the reset switch and then the start switch turns on the contactors.
- 2) When the main contacts of the contactors are welded, do not start the robot. Input the auxiliary contacts (normally closed contacts) to the safety programmable controller to check for welding.
- 3) The reset switch and start switch become valid only when turned off to avoid operation at contact welding or short-circuit.
- 4) The contactor output is turned off when the light curtain signal or the relay input of mat switch is turned off or an error is detected in the safety remote I/O station on CC-Link Safety after the start.

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Figure 5.32 Entering detection and existence detection (Partially quoted from "Safety Guide Book - the safety measures of machinery in the workplace" : Nippon Electric Control Equipment Industries Association.)



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(2) Connection of safety devices



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## (3) Wiring diagram and parameter settings

### (a) CC remote (1): SR\_IO1

Wire the light curtain and the mat switch to the CC-Link Safety remote I/O module as follows.



Figure 5.34 CC remote (1) SR\_IO1 wiring



#### For the light curtain and the mat switch, set the parameters as follows. Table 5.21 CC remote (1) SR\_IO1 parameter settings

Item	Setting <sup>*4*5</sup>
3. Time of noise removal filter X4, 5 <sup>*1</sup>	"1ms"
5. Time of noise removal filter X8, 9 <sup>*1</sup>	"1ms"
11. Doubling input discrepancy detection time X4, $5^{*2}$	"20ms"
13. Doubling input discrepancy detection time X8, $9^{*2}$	"20ms"
19. Input dark test selection X4, 5	"Not execute"
21. Input dark test selection X8, 9	"Execute"
25. Input dark test pulse OFF time <sup>*1</sup>	"400µs"
40. Doubling/single input selection X4, $5^{*3}$	"Doubling input"
42. Doubling/single input selection X8, 9 <sup>*3</sup>	"Doubling input"
46. Auto RTN Func to detect doubling input mismatch*3	"Invalid"

\*1: Adjust the values of Time of noise removal filter and Input dark test pulse OFF time according to the installation environment and wiring length.

\*2: Set Doubling input discrepancy detection time to 100ms for the mechanical switch and 20ms for the sensor input as a standard.

\*3: The parameter is added to the QS0J65BTB2-12DT of technical version D.

When a module of technical version C or earlier is used, the parameter is not available.\*4: For setting range, refer to the following.

CC-Link Safety System Remote I/O Module User's Manual

\*5: Always set the enclosed option for this case example.

## (b) CC remote (4): SR\_IO4

Wire the contactors to the CC-Link Safety remote I/O module as follows.







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#### For the contactors, set the parameters as follows. Table 5.22 CC remote (4) SR\_IO4 parameter settings

Item	Setting <sup>*4*5</sup>
5. Time of noise removal filter X8, 9 <sup>*1</sup>	"1ms"
13. Doubling input discrepancy detection time X8, 9 <sup>*2</sup>	"100ms"
21. Input dark test selection X8, 9	"Execute"
25. Input dark test pulse OFF time <sup>*1</sup>	"400µs"
26. Method of wiring of output Y0	"Doubling wiring (Source+Source)"
27. Method of wiring of output Y1	"Doubling wiring (Source+Source)"
30. Output dark test selection Y0	"Execute"
31. Output dark test selection Y1	"Execute"
34. Output dark test pulse OFF time Y0 <sup>*1</sup>	"1ms"
35. Output dark test pulse OFF time Y1*1	"1ms"
42. Doubling/single input selection X8, 9 <sup>*3</sup>	"Doubling input"
46. Auto RTN Func to detect doubling input mismatch <sup>*3</sup>	"Invalid"

\*1: Adjust the values of Time of noise removal filter, Input dark test pulse OFF time, and Output dark test pulse OFF time according to the installation environment and wiring length.

- \*2: Set Doubling input discrepancy detection time to 100ms for the mechanical switch and 20ms for the sensor input as a standard.
- \*3: The parameter is added to the QS0J65BTB2-12DT of technical version D.
- When a module of technical version C or earlier is used, the parameter is not available.
- \*4: For setting range, refer to the following.
  - CC-Link Safety System Remote I/O Module User's Manual
- \*5: Always set the enclosed option for this case example.

#### (4) Device numbers to be used

The following device numbers are used in the sequence program.

Table 5.23 Device numbers to be used

Safety/standard	External device	Device number
Safety	Light curtain	X104 or X105
Safety	Mat switch	X108 or X109
Safety	Contactors 1 and 2	Y200 and Y201
Safety	Contactor (check for welding)	X208 or X209
Standard	Reset switch	X140
Standard	Start switch	X142

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# SAFETY APPLICATION CONFIGURATION EXAMPLE (USING A SINGLE SAFETY PROGRAMMABLE CONTROLLER)

(5) Sequence program OVERVIEW The sequence program performs the following processing. ¥200 ¥201 X140 Π -1/4 -14 ⊣th -Гмол К1 DO D0.0 2 x140 -|↓|--[MOV K2 DO -| | Ladder which checks the falling edge (ON→OFF) of the reset switch, accepts the reset request, SD1272.0 and releases the interlock for the CC-Link Safety. -[sei SD1276.0 ┥┟ APPLICATION EXAMPLE SD1072.0 [SE1 SD1076.0  $\dashv$   $\vdash$ SD1272.0 SD1276.0 11 SD1276.0 ] -1/F  $\dashv$ RSI Ladder which confirms the interlock released 3 SD1072.0 SD1076.0 status and cancels the interlock release request. 20 SD1076.0 RISK ASSESSMENT AND SAFETY LEVEL -//- $\dashv$ RSI DO.1 м5 x142 23 -1 F -|↑|-Гмоч К1 D1 D1 0 м5 x142 Ladder which checks the falling edge (ON →OFF) 28 D1 K2 -MOV  $\dashv$   $\vdash$ ⊣₩ of the start switch and accepts the start request. кO DO Гмоч 4 Ladder which checks the contact welding PRECAUTIONS FOR USE OF SAFETY PROGRAMMABLE CONTROLLER ¥200 ¥201 x208 кз in the contactor. 35 -14 -14 11 ΤO T0 is an off delay timer for the contactor. Ladder which checks the status of a robot (whether it is ready to be started or be back SD1204.0 X104 X108 ΤC 42 (м5 --14 to operation). 41 Гмол КŪ D1 -Ladder which cancels the start or reset request when safety cannot be confirmed. 5 D0.1 [MOV кO DO D1.1 53 (¥200 4 1 Ladder which controls an output to the contactor. -(¥201 Fend 51 11 TROLLERS) 9

#### Figure 5.36 Sequence program

The following shows the constant and internal devices used in the program.

#### (a) Way of using the constant

K indicates decimal number.

Example) K1 = 1 of decimal number

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#### (b) Way of using the internal devices

Table 5.24 Way of using the internal devices

Internal device	Description
то	Timer device
10	Times out after a lapse of the time specified at $K\Box$ .
	Word device
	Used as restart status in this program.
D0	(1) D0 = 0: Initial status or start processing completed
	(2) D0 = 1 (D0.0: on): Reset switch activated
	(3) D0 = 2 (D0.1: on): Restart processing completed (Reset switch released after activated in (2))
	Word device
D1	Used as start status in this program.
	(1) D1 = 0: Initial status or safety not confirmed
	(2) D1 = 1 (D1.0: on): Start switch activated
	(3) D1 = 2 (D1.1: on): Start processing completed (Start switch released after activated in (2))

#### (c) Way of using word device bit specification

 $D \square \square$ . indicates the  $\square$ th bit data of word device  $D \square \square$ .

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Example) D0.0 = 0 bits in D0

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Figure 5.37 Word device bit specification

#### (6) Timing chart



Figure 5.38 Timing chart

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#### 5.6.5 Door lock circuit

## (1) Application overview

This application prevents the door from being opened until a robot is de-energized with the safety switch on the door of a safety barrier.

The safety switch is usually interlocked with spring. By applying a voltage to a solenoid, the interlock is released and the door can be opened.

The robot cannot be started while the interlock is released or the door is open. This section shows an example where the interlock of the safety switch is released by activating the stop switch and the safety switch is re-interlocked by activating the reset switch.

Start and stop of the robot is controlled with contactors that close and open the power supply.

Connect the safety switch and contactors to a safety programmable controller. The safety programmable controller turns on/off the main contacts of the contactors with sequence program.

When the safety programmable controller detects an error by self-diagnostics, outputs to the contactors turn off independent of the sequence program.

In this case, the outputs remain off until the safety CPU module or CC-Link Safety remote I/O module is reset independent of the sequence program.

Configure the sequence program so that the following functions can be achieved.

- 1) After ensuring safety (The safety switch is on.), activating the reset switch and then the start switch turns on the contactors.
- 2) When the main contacts of the contactors are welded, do not start the robot. Input the auxiliary contacts (normally closed contacts) to the safety programmable controller to check for welding.
- 3) The reset switch and start switch become valid only when turned off to avoid operation at contact welding or short-circuit.
- 4) Activating the stop switch turns off outputs to the contactors. After that, release the interlock to the safety switch (The safety barrier door can be opened).
- 5) Activating the reset switch re-interlocks the safety switch.
- 6) When an error is detected in the safety remote I/O station on CC-Link Safety after operation, outputs to the contactors turn off.





Figure 5.39 Isolation of hazardous area by door interlock (Partially quoted from "Safety Guide Book - the safety measures of machinery in the workplace" : Nippon Electric Control Equipment Industries Association.)

# SAFETY APPLICATION CONFIGURATION EXAMPLE (USING A SINGLE SAFETY PROGRAMMABLE CONTROLLER)





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### (3) Wiring diagram and parameter settings

### (a) CC remote (1): SR\_IO1

Wire the safety switch and contactors to the CC-Link Safety remote I/O module as follows.



Figure 5.41 CC remote (1) SR\_IO1 wiring

This example shows when the door open/close signal of the safety switch is input. When using a safety switch whose locking status can be monitored, input the locking status signal to the CC-Link Safety remote I/O module as well.

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## For the safety switch and contactors, set the parameters as follows.

Table 5.25 CC remote	e (1) SR_IO1	parameter	settings
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SAFETY APPLICATION CONFIGURATION EXAMPLE (USING A SINGLE SAFETY PROGRAMMABLE CONTROLLER)

Item	Setting <sup>*4*5</sup>
6. Time of noise removal filter XA, B <sup>*1</sup>	"1ms"
8. Time of noise removal filter XE, F <sup>*1</sup>	"1ms"
14. Doubling input discrepancy detection time XA, $B^{*2}$	"100ms"
16. Doubling input discrepancy detection time XE, $F^{*2}$	"500ms"
22. Input dark test selection XA, B	"Execute"
24. Input dark test selection XE, F	"Execute"
25. Input dark test pulse OFF time <sup>*1</sup>	"400 µ s"
27. Method of wiring of output Y1	"Doubling wiring (Source+Sink)"
29. Method of wiring of output Y3	"Doubling wiring (Source+Sink)"
31. Output dark test selection Y1	"Execute"
33. Output dark test selection Y3	"Execute"
35. Output dark test pulse OFF time Y1*1	"1ms"
37. Output dark test pulse OFF time Y3*1	"1ms"
43. Doubling/single input selection XA, $B^{*3}$	"Doubling input"
45. Doubling/single input selection XE, $F^{*3}$	"Doubling input"
46. Auto RTN Func to detect doubling input mismatch <sup>*3</sup>	"invalid"

- \*1: Adjust the values of Time of noise removal filter, Input dark test pulse OFF time, and Output dark test pulse OFF time according to the installation environment and wiring length.
- \*2: Set Doubling input discrepancy detection time to 100ms for the mechanical switch and 20ms for the sensor input as a standard.
- \*3: The parameter is added to the QS0J65BTB2-12DT of technical version D. When a module of technical version C or earlier is used, the parameter is not available.
- \*4: For setting range, refer to the following.
  - CC-Link Safety System Remote I/O Module User's Manual
- \*5: Always set the enclosed option for this case example.
- (4) Device numbers to be used

The following device numbers are used in the sequence program.

#### Table 5.26 Device numbers to be used

Safety/standard	External device	Device number
Safety	Safety switch	X10E or X10F
Safety	Release of interlock to safety switch	Y103
Safety	Contactor	Y101
Safety	Contactor (check for welding)	X10A or X10B
Standard	Reset switch	X140
Standard	Start switch	X142
Standard	Stop switch	X144



## (5) Sequence program

The sequence program performs the following processing.



Figure 5.42 Sequence program

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The following shows the constant and internal devices used in the program.

## (a) Way of using the constant

 $\mathsf{K}\square$  indicates decimal number.

Example) K1 = 1 of decimal number

(b) Way of using the internal devices

Table 5.27 W	lay of using	the internal	devices
--------------	--------------	--------------	---------

Internal device	Description	
то	Timer device	
10	Times out after a lapse of the time specified at $K\square$ .	
	Word device	
	Used as restart status in this program.	
D0	(1) D0 = 0: Initial status or start processing completed	
	(2) D0 = 1 (D0.0: on): Reset switch activated	
	(3) D0 = 2 (D0.1: on): Restart processing completed (Reset switch released after activated in (2))	
	Word device	
D1	Used as start status in this program.	
	(1) D1 = 0: Initial status or safety not confirmed	
	(2) D1 = 1 (D1.0: on): Start switch activated	
	(3) D1 = 2 (D1.1: on): Start processing completed (Start switch released after activated in (2))	

### (c) Way of using word device bit specification

 $D\square\square$ . indicates the in the bit data of word device  $D\square\square$ . Example) D0.0 = 0 bits in D0



Figure 5.43 Word device bit specification



(6) Timing chart

Figure 5.44 Timing chart

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## (7) Program using safety FB

#### Table 5.28 Safety FBs to be used

FB name	Function	Description
	External device	This FB monitors safety equipment such as
F+EDM		an actuator and a contactor and controls a
	monitor	safety output.
F+GLOCK Guard lock and interlocking	Cuard look and	This FB controls an entrance to a hazardous
		area via an interlocking guard with guard
	Interlocking	locking ("four state interlocking").





For details on the safety FBs, F+GLOCK, and F+EDM, refer to the following.

In this example, the door open/close signal of the safety switch is used as an input signal. Therefore, this signal (X10E) is connected to the input signal, S\_GuardLock (safety guard locking status), of the F+GLOCK as well.

When using a safety switch whose locking status can be monitored, connect the locking status signal to S\_GuardLock.

If a safety switch that cannot monitor the door open/close signal is used, connect the locking status signal to the two input signals, S\_GuardMon (safety guard interlock status monitoring) and S\_GuardLock, of the G+GLOCK.

In this case, the timer, T1 (timer for waiting the F+GLOCK to be enabled) in the program above, must be programmed.



## (8) Timing chart

Figure 5.46 Timing chart

## 5.6.6 3-position enable switch

(1) Application overview

This application controls energization of a robot with 3-position enable switch while a worker teaches or maintenances the robot in a safety barrier with the safety barrier door open.

For interlocking the door and releasing the interlock during automatic operation, refer to Section 5.6.5.

Start and stop of the robot is controlled with contactors that close and open the power supply.

Connect the enable switch, safety switch, and contactors to a safety programmable controller.

The safety programmable controller turns on/off the main contacts of the contactors with sequence program.

When the safety programmable controller detects an error by self-diagnostics, outputs to the contactors turn off independent of the sequence program.

In this case, the outputs remain off until the safety CPU module or CC-Link Safety remote I/O module is reset independent of the sequence program.

Configure the sequence program so that the following functions can be achieved.

- Switch the operation mode to manual so that automatic operation may not be allowed. In the manual mode, take measures for safety such as limitation of operation speed of the robot.
- 2) In the manual mode, operation using except the enable switch is inhibited.
- 3) When the enable switch is held down in the middle position, the robot is energized. In this case, the robot operation is independent of status of the safety barrier door (Even when the door is open, operation at limited speed is possible).
- 4) When the main contacts of the contactors are welded, do not start the robot. Input the auxiliary contacts (normally closed contacts) to the safety programmable controller to check for welding.
- 5) When an error is detected in the safety remote I/O station on CC-Link Safety after operation, outputs to the contactors turn off.



Figure 5.47 3-position enable switch

(Partially quoted from "Safety Guide Book - the safety measures of machinery in the workplace" : Nippon Electric Control Equipment Industries Association.) OVERVIEW

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## (2) Connection of safety devices

Figure 5.48 Safety device connection diagram
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#### (3) Wiring diagram and parameter settings

#### (a) CC remote (1): SR\_IO1

Wire the enable switch, safety switch, and contactors to the CC-Link Safety remote I/O module as follows.





For the enable switch, safety switch, and contactors, set the parameters as follows.

Item	Setting <sup>*4*5</sup>
1. Time of noise removal filter X0, 1 <sup>*1</sup>	"1ms"
6. Time of noise removal filter XA, B <sup>*1</sup>	"1ms"
7. Time of noise removal filter XC, D <sup>*1</sup>	"1ms"
9. Doubling input discrepancy detection time X0, 1 <sup>*2</sup>	"500ms"
14. Doubling input discrepancy detection time XA, $B^{*2}$	"100ms"
15. Doubling input discrepancy detection time XC, $D^{*2}$	"100ms"
17. Input dark test selection X0, 1	"Execute"
22. Input dark test selection XA, B	"Execute"
23. Input dark test selection XC, D	"Execute"
25. Input dark test pulse OFF time <sup>*1</sup>	"400 µ s"
27. Method of wiring of output Y1	"Doubling wiring (Source+Sink)"
31. Output dark test selection Y1	"Execute"
35. Output dark test pulse OFF time Y1*1	"1ms"
38. Doubling/single input selection X0, $1^{*3}$	"Doubling input"
43. Doubling/single input selection XA, B <sup>*3</sup>	"Doubling input"
44. Doubling/single input selection XC, D <sup>*3</sup>	"Doubling input"
46. Auto RTN Func to detect doubling input mismatch*3	"invalid"

#### Table 5.29 CC remote (1) SR\_IO1 parameter settings

\*1: Adjust the values of Time of noise removal filter, Input dark test pulse OFF time, and Output dark test pulse OFF time according to the installation environment and wiring length.

\*2: Set Doubling input discrepancy detection time to 100ms for the mechanical switch and 20ms for the sensor input as a standard.

\*3: The parameter is added to the QS0J65BTB2-12DT of technical version D. When a module of technical version C or earlier is used, the parameter is not available.

\*4: For setting range, refer to the following.

CC-Link Safety System Remote I/O Module User's Manual

\*5: Always set the enclosed option for this case example.

#### (b) CC remote (2): R\_IO2

Wire the reset switch, start switch, and mode selection (manual, automatic) switch to the standard remote I/O module as follows.



Figure 5.50 CC remote (2) R\_IO2 wiring

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#### (4) Device numbers to be used

The following device numbers are used in the sequence program.

 Table 5.30 Device numbers to be used

Safety/standard	External device	Device number
Safety	Safety switch	X100 or X101
Safety	Enable switch	X10C or X10D
Safety	Contactor	Y101
Safety	Contactor (check for welding)	X10A or X10B
Standard	Reset switch	X120
Standard	Start switch	X121
Standard	Manual mode	X122
Standard	Automatic mode	X123

(5) Sequence program

The sequence program performed the following processing.



Figure 5.51 Sequence program

MELSEG QS series 1 The following shows the constant and internal devices used in the program. (a) Way of using the constant OVERVIEW K□ indicates decimal number. Example) K1 = 1 of decimal number 2 (b) Way of using the internal devices Table 5.31 Way of using the internal devices APPLICATION EXAMPLE Internal device Description Timer device Τ0 Times out after a lapse of the time specified at K□. 3 (c) Way of using word device bit specification RISK ASSESSMENT AND SAFETY LEVEL  $D \square \square . \square$  indicates the  $\square$ th bit data of word device  $D \square \square$ . Example) D0.0 = 0 bits in D0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 Figure 5.52 Word device bit specification 4 PRECAUTIONS FOR USE OF SAFETY PROGRAMMABLE CONTROLLER (6) Timing chart Mode switched Mode: Automatic (X123) 5 Mode: Manual (X122) LER) In manual mode the reset switch and Reset switch (X120) start switch cannot be used. Reset status (M1) Reset status (M2) Start switch (X121) TROLLERS) 9 Error occurred on the safety remote I/O station on In manual mode, the operation Start status (M3) CC-Link Safety using the enable switch is possible even though the door is When an error occurs on the Start status (M4) open. safety remote I/O station on CC-Link Safety, inputs and outputs of the corresponding Interlocked status (SD1072.0) station are turned off. The contact welding is detected when Door opened the contactor output and the contactor Interlock released status (SD1076.0) output check signals are both off. Enable Enable When the contact welding is detected, switch switch the safety output is not turned on. CC-Link status (SD1004.0) turned off turned on Safety switch (X100) Enable switch (X10C) APPENDICES Safety information (M5) Contactor output (Y101)

Figure 5.53 Timing chart

Contactor output check (X10A)

(7) Program using safety FB

Table 5.32 Safety FBs to be used

FB name	Function	Description
External device	This FB monitors safety equipment such as	
F+EDM	monitor	an actuator and a contactor and controls a
		safety output.
	Enable switch	This FB monitors the 3-position enable
F+ENBLSW Enable switch		switch signal.
	F+GMON Guard monitoring	This FB monitors a safety guard using two
F+GMON		safety switches and dual switch discrepancy
		time (Monitoring Time) when the guard is
		closed.
F+MODSEL	Mode selector	This FB is used for selecting an operation
		mode such as manual and semi-automatic.

78	X120 SD1072. 0			[SET	SD1076.0 ]	Ladder which releases the interlock when communication failure or I/O error
81	SD1072.0 SD1076.0			[RST	SD1076.0 ]	occurs on the safety remote I/O station on CC-Link Safety.
84	M2 X120				—(M3 )	Ladder which converts the Reset input bit
	M2 X121 M11					of the safety FB, F+EDM.
91	SD1004. 0	F+MODSEL B:Activate	.(FB1) Ready∶B -			
	X122	B:S_Mode0	S_Mode0Sel:B-		—(M10 )	
	X123	B:S_Mode1	S_Mode1Sel:B-		—(M11 )	
	SM401	B:S_Mode2	S_Mode2Sel∶B –			
	SM401	B:S_Mode3	S_Mode3Sel∶B -			
	SM401 	-B:S_Mode4	S_Mode4Sel∶B -			
	SM401	B:S_Mode5	S_Mode5Sel∶B -			Ladder which selects the mode
	SM401	B:S_Mode6	S_Mode6Sel∶B_			(manual mode or automatic mode).
	SM401	B:S_Mode7	S_Mode7Sel∶B_			
	SM400	B:S_Unlock	S_AnyModeSel:B-			
	SM401	B:S_SetMode	Error∶B –			
	SM400	B:AutoSetMode	DiagCode∶W -			
	[К10	]D:ModeMonitorTime				
	X120	B:Reset				

## SAFETY APPLICATION CONFIGURATION EXAMPLE (USING A SINGLE SAFETY PROGRAMMABLE CONTROLLER)

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Figure 5.54 Program using safety FB

For details on the safety FBs, F+MODSEL, F+GMON, F+ENBLSW, and F+EDM, refer to the following.

**QSCPU** Programming Manual (Safety FB)

In this example, an enable switch with no monitor signal for position 3 is used. Therefore, SM400 (always ON) is connected to the input signal, S\_EnableSwCh2, of the F+ENBLSW. (S\_EnableSwCh2 is a signal for the contacts E3 and E4 of the connected enable switch.)

When an enable switch with monitor signal for position 3 is used, connect the corresponding signal to the input signal, S\_EnableSwCh2, to monitor the status of position 3.

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Figure 5.55 Timing chart

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## 5.6.7 Sequential muting

#### (1) Application overview

This function temporarily invalidates a shading detection signal such as a light curtain. This function allows carrying members into a hazardous area without de-energizing a robot.

The muting is controlled with a muting sensor.

This section explains a sequential muting with four muting sensors.

Start and stop of the robot is controlled with contactors that close and open the power supply.

Connect the light curtain and contactors to a safety programmable controller.

The safety programmable controller turns on/off the main contacts of the contactors with sequence program.

When the safety programmable controller detects an error by self-diagnostics, outputs to the contactors turn off independent of the sequence program.

In this case, the outputs remain off until the safety CPU module or CC-Link Safety remote I/O module is reset independent of the sequence program.

Configure the sequence program so that the following functions can be achieved.

- After completing the previous process, allow the muting and then start carrying members in the hazardous area. This section shows an example when a start of carry is detected with sensors.
- 2) The muting is enabled when the four muting sensors detected works in correct timing and order while the muting is set to be allowed. The robot is de-energized when detected timing or order is incorrect. For the correct timing and order, and conditions to start and end the muting, refer to the QSCPU Programming Manual (Safety FB). Once muting has been started, the second muting operation will be disabled.
- Set valid period of muting.
   If the muting does not end within the set period, it is forcibly terminated and the robot is de-energized.
- 4) A muting lamp is on during the muting so that muting status can be easily recognized.

If an error such as disconnection occurs due to faulty wiring to a muting lamp during muting, the muting is suspended.

- 5) When the main contacts of the contactors are welded, do not start the robot. Input the auxiliary contacts (normally closed contacts) to the safety programmable controller to check for welding.
- 6) When an error is detected in the safety remote I/O station on CC-Link Safety after operation, outputs to the contactors turn off.

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# SAFETY APPLICATION CONFIGURATION EXAMPLE (USING A SINGLE SAFETY PROGRAMMABLE CONTROLLER)

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Figure 5.56 Sequential muting

(Partially quoted from "Safety Guide Book - the safety measures of machinery in the workplace" : Nippon Electric Control Equipment Industries Association.)

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#### (3) Wiring diagram and parameter settings

#### (a) CC remote (1): SR\_IO1

Wire the light curtain and contactors to the CC-Link Safety remote I/O module as follows.



Figure 5.58 CC remote (1) SR\_IO1 wiring

One muting lamp is connected in this example.

When two muting lamps are connected between Y0+ and Y0- (same wiring with the contactors 1 and 2 in the figure above), the muting is not suspended even if disconnection occurs to wiring of either of the muting lamp (suspended if disconnection occurs to wiring of both of the muting lamps).

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### For the light curtain and contactors, set the parameters as follows.

Table 5.33 CC remote (1) S	R_IO1 parameter setting
----------------------------	-------------------------

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Item	Setting <sup>*4*5</sup>
3. Time of noise removal filter X4, 5 <sup>*1</sup>	"1ms"
6. Time of noise removal filter XA, B <sup>*1</sup>	"1ms"
11. Doubling input discrepancy detection time X4, $5^{*2}$	"100ms"
14. Doubling input discrepancy detection time XA, $B^{*2}$	"100ms"
19. Input dark test selection X4, 5	"Not execute"
22. Input dark test selection XA, B	"Execute"
25. Input dark test pulse OFF time <sup>*1</sup>	"400 <i>µ</i> s"
26. Method of wiring of output Y0	"Doubling wiring (Source+Sink)"
27. Method of wiring of output Y1	"Doubling wiring (Source+Sink)"
30. Output dark test selection Y0	"Execute"
31. Output dark test selection Y1	"Execute"
34. Output dark test pulse OFF time Y0*1	"1ms"
35. Output dark test pulse OFF time Y1*1	"1ms"
40. Doubling/single input selection X4, $5^{*3}$	"Doubling input"
43. Doubling/single input selection XA, $B^{*3}$	"Doubling input"
46. Auto RTN Func to detect doubling input mismatch $^{^{\ast}3}$	"Invalid"

\*1: Adjust the values of Time of noise removal filter, Input dark test pulse OFF time, and Output dark test pulse OFF time according to the installation environment and wiring length.

\*2: Set Doubling input discrepancy detection time to 100ms for the mechanical switch and 20ms for the sensor input as a standard.

\*3: The parameter is added to the QS0J65BTB2-12DT of technical version D.
When a module of technical version C or earlier is used, the parameter is not available.
\*4: For setting range, refer to the following.

- CC-Link Safety System Remote I/O Module User's Manual
- \*5: Always set the enclosed option for this case example.



#### (b) CC remote (2): R\_IO2

Wire the reset switch, start switch, and muting sensors to the standard remote I/O module as follows.



Figure 5.59 CC remote (2) R IO2 wiring

(4) Device numbers to be used

The following device numbers are used in the sequence program.

#### Table 5.34 Device numbers to be used

Safety/standard	External device	Device number
Safety	Light curtain	X104 or X105
Safety	Contactor	Y101
Safety	Contactor (check for welding)	X10A or X10B
Safety	Muting clamp	Y100
Standard	Reset switch	X120
Standard	Start switch	X121
Standard	Muting start enable sensor	X123
Standard	Muting sensor 1	X12C
Standard	Muting sensor 2	X12D
Standard	Muting sensor 3	X12E
Standard	Muting sensor 4	X12F

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#### (5) Program using safety FB

Table 5.35 Safety FBs to be used			
FB name	Function	Description	
	External device	This FB monitors safety equipment such as	
F+EDM monitor	an actuator and a contactor and controls a		
	safety output.		
F+MUTES Sequential muting	In this FB, sequential muting with four muting		
	sensors is specified.		



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For details on the safety FBs, F+MUTES, and F+EDM, refer to the following.

In this example, an error occurs on the safety remote I/O station on CC-Link Safety when a disconnection occurs in the muting lamp wiring.

To avoid an error in the safety remote I/O station on CC-Link Safety due to this kind of error, perform the following:

- Set "1: Not execute" for "Output dark test selection" for the output where the muting clamp is connected.
- Use a muting lamp that can output its status (turns on at normal and turns off if an error occurs).
- Connect a state output signal to the input of the safety FB, S\_MutingLamp.

This is an example for performing sequential muting with four muting sensors. To perform parallel muting, use F+MUTE2 or F+MUTEP instead of F+MUTES.



## (6) Timing chart

Figure 5.61 Timing chart

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## 5.6.8 Two-hand operation switch

(1) Application overview

This application prevents a worker from approaching to hazardous area by energizing a robot only when two buttons are simultaneously activated with both hands. A press machine that starts sliding by activating two buttons is the typical application

example. Start and stop of the robot is controlled with contactors that close and open the power supply.

Connect the two-hand operation switch and contactors to a safety programmable controller.

The safety programmable controller turns on/off the main contacts of the contactors with a sequence program.

When the safety programmable controller detects an error by self-diagnostics, outputs to the contactors turn off independent of the sequence program.

In this case, the outputs remain off until the safety CPU module or CC-Link Safety remote I/O module is reset independent of the sequence program.

Configure the sequence program so that the following functions can be achieved.

- After ensuring safety, activate the two buttons on the two-hand operation switch. The contactors turn on only when timing when the buttons are activated is within 500ms difference.
- 2) When the main contacts of the contactors are welded, do not start the robot. Input the auxiliary contacts (normally closed contacts) to the safety programmable controller to check for welding.
- 3) When one or both of the hands are released from the buttons or an error is detected in the safety remote I/O station on CC-Link Safety after operation, outputs to the contactors turn off.



Figure 5.62 Two-hand operation switch (Partially quoted from "Safety Guide Book - the safety measures of machinery in the workplace" : Nippon Electric Control Equipment Industries Association.)



### (2) Connection of safety devices

Figure 5.63 Safety device connection diagram

### (3) Wiring diagram and parameter settings

#### (a) CC remote (1): SR\_IO1

Wire the contactors to the CC-Link Safety remote I/O module as follows.



Figure 5.64 CC remote (1) SR IO1 wiring

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#### For the contactors, set the parameters as follows.

#### Table 5.36 CC remote (1) SR\_IO1 parameter settings

Item	Setting <sup>*4*5</sup>
6. Time of noise removal filter XA, B <sup>*1</sup>	"1ms"
14. Doubling input discrepancy detection time XA, $B^{*2}$	"100ms"
22. Input dark test selection XA, B	"Execute"
25. Input dark test pulse OFF time <sup>*1</sup>	"400µs"
27. Method of wiring of output Y1	"Doubling wiring (Source+Sink)"
31. Output dark test selection Y1	"Execute"
35. Output dark test pulse OFF time Y1 <sup>*1</sup>	"1ms"
43. Doubling/single input selection XA, B <sup>*3</sup>	"Doubling input"
46. Auto RTN Func to detect doubling input mismatch*3	"Invalid"

\*1: Adjust the values of Time of noise removal filter, Input dark test pulse OFF time, and Output dark test pulse OFF time according to the installation environment and wiring length.

\*2: Set Doubling input discrepancy detection time to 100ms for the mechanical switch and 20ms for the sensor input as a standard.

\*3: The parameter is added to the QS0J65BTB2-12DT of technical version D.

When a module of technical version C or earlier is used, the parameter is not available.\*4: For setting range, refer to the following.

CC-Link Safety System Remote I/O Module User's Manual

\*5: Always set the enclosed option for this case example.

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Figure 5.65 CC remote (3) R\_IO3 wiring

\*1: The switches can be wired to X8, X9, XA, and XB terminals.

#### • Parameter setting example

Table 5.37 CC remote (3) SR\_IO3 parameter settings

Item	Setting <sup>*3*4</sup>
5. Time of noise removal filter X8, 9 <sup>*1</sup>	"1ms"
6. Time of noise removal filter XA, B <sup>*1</sup>	"1ms"
7. Time of noise removal filter XC, D <sup>*1</sup>	"1ms"
8. Time of noise removal filter XE, F <sup>*1</sup>	"1ms"
13. Doubling input discrepancy detection time X8, 9 <sup>*2</sup>	"Do not detect"
14. Doubling input discrepancy detection time XA, $B^{*2}$	"Do not detect"
15. Doubling input discrepancy detection time XC, $D^{*2}$	"Do not detect"
16. Doubling input discrepancy detection time XE, F <sup>*2</sup>	"Do not detect"
21. Input dark test selection X8, 9	"Execute"
22. Input dark test selection XA, B	"Execute"
23. Input dark test selection XC, D	"Execute"
24. Input dark test selection XE, F	"Execute"
25. Input dark test pulse OFF time <sup>*1</sup>	"400µs"
42. Doubling/single input selection X8, 9	"X8: Single input, X9: No Use"
43. Doubling/single input selection XA, B	"XA: Single input, XB: No Use"
44. Doubling/single input selection XC, D	"XC: Single input, XD: No Use"
45. Doubling/single input selection XE, F	"XE: Single input, XF: No Use"
46. Auto RTN Func to detect doubling input mismatch	"Invalid"

\*1: Adjust the values of Time of noise removal filter and Input dark test pulse OFF time according to the installation environment and wiring length.

- \*2: Set Doubling input discrepancy detection time to 100ms for the mechanical switch and 20ms for the sensor input as a standard.
- \*3: For setting range, refer to the following.
- \*4: Always set the enclosed option for this case example.







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#### · Parameter setting example

Table 5.38 CC remote (3) SR\_IO3 parameter settings

Item	Setting <sup>*3*4</sup>
5. Time of noise removal filter X8, 9 <sup>*1</sup>	"1ms"
6. Time of noise removal filter XA, B <sup>*1</sup>	"1ms"
7. Time of noise removal filter XC, D <sup>*1</sup>	"1ms"
8. Time of noise removal filter XE, F <sup>*1</sup>	"1ms"
13. Doubling input discrepancy detection time X8, 9 <sup>*2</sup>	"100ms"
14. Doubling input discrepancy detection time XA, $B^{*2}$	"100ms"
15. Doubling input discrepancy detection time XC, D <sup>*2</sup>	"100ms"
16. Doubling input discrepancy detection time XE, $F^{*2}$	"100ms"
21. Input dark test selection X8, 9	"Not execute"
22. Input dark test selection XA, B	"Not execute"
23. Input dark test selection XC, D	"Not execute"
24. Input dark test selection XE, F	"Not execute"
25. Input dark test pulse OFF time <sup>*1</sup>	"400µs"

\*1: Adjust the values of Time of noise removal filter and Input dark test pulse OFF time according to the installation environment and wiring length.

- \*2: Set Doubling input discrepancy detection time to 100ms for the mechanical switch and 20ms for the sensor input as a standard.
- \*3: For setting range, refer to the following.
  - CC-Link Safety System Remote I/O Module User's Manual
- \*4: Always set the enclosed option for this case example.

#### (4) Device numbers to be used

The following device numbers are used in the sequence program.

#### Table 5.39 Device numbers to be used

Safety/standard	External device	Device number
Safety	Two-hand operation switch 1 (NC)	X148
Safety	Two-hand operation switch 1 (NO)	X14A
Safety	Two-hand operation switch 2 (NC)	X14C
Safety	Two-hand operation switch 2 (NO)	X14E
Safety	Contactor	Y101
Safety	Contactor (check for welding)	X10A or X10B
Standard	Reset switch	X140

#### (5) Program using safety FB

Table 5.40 Safety FBs to be used					
FB name	Function	Description			
F+2HAND3	Two hand switch Type	This FB provides the two-hand control			
		functionality (Fixed specified time difference			
		is 500 ms).			
		This FB converts two bit inputs (NO/NC pair)			
F+ANTI	Dual input (NO+NC)	to one bit output with discrepancy time			
		monitoring.			
	Extornal dovico	This FB monitors safety equipment such as			
F+EDM	monitor	an actuator and a contactor and controls a			
	monitor	safety output.			

SD1072.0 X140 Ladder which releases the interlock ۹n -[SET SD1076.0 -M +when communication failure or I/O error SD1072.0 SD1076.0 occurs on the safety remote I/O station on 03 SD1076.0 --Frs1 CC-Link Safety. F+ANTI (FB1) SD1004.2 96 -J/F B:Activate Ready:E X14A B:S\_ChanneINC S\_AntivalentOut: **(**M10 Ladder which checks the logic of the normally closed and normally open contacts X148 B:S\_Channe I NO Error:B of the two-hand operation switch 1. ++-FK10 ] D:DiscrepancyTime DiagCode:V SD1004.2 F+ANTI (FB2) 127 B:Activate Ready:E -14 X14E B:S\_ChanneINC S\_AntivalentOut: **C**M11 ++Ladder which checks the logic of the normally closed and normally open contacts X14C B:S\_ChanneINO of the two-hand operation switch 2. Error:E ┥┟ -**F**K10 7 D:DiscrepancyTime DiagCode:V SM400 F+2HAND3 (FB3) 158 B:Activate Ready: B M10 B:S Button1 S TwoHandOut:E ┥┟ -(M1 Ladder which monitors the status of M11 the two-hand operation switch. B:S Button2 Error:E DiagCode:V F+EDM (FB4) SD1004.0 186 B:Activate -11 Readv:E M -i i B:S\_OutControl S\_EDM\_Out:E -(Y101 Ladder which monitors the contact welding in the contactor. X10A B:S EDM1 Error:E Connect SM400 (always on) to the input signal, S\_StartReset, of the F+EDM X10B so that the safety output is turned on B:S EDM2 DiagCode:W as soon as both operation switches 1 and 2 are activated. Гкзо D:MonitoringTime Activate the reset switch to clear an error SM400 occurred in the safety FB. B:S\_StartReset ΗF X140 B:Reset 230 -FEND



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For details on the safety FBs, F+ANTI, F+2HAND3, and F+EDM, refer to the following.

CF QSCPU Programming Manual (Safety FB)

In this example, the time difference (within 500ms) for two buttons to be turned on is checked. If the time difference does not need to be checked, use the F+2HAND2, instead of the F+2HAND3.



#### (6) Timing chart

Figure 5.68 Timing chart

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# CHAPTER 6 SAFETY APPLICATION CONFIGURATION EXAMPLE (USING SEVERAL SAFETY PROGRAMMABLE CONTROLLERS)

This chapter describes a configuration example of a safety application using three safety programmable controllers that perform safety communication.

## 6.1 System Configuration

This chapter describes a safety application using the system configuration shown in Figure 6.1.



Figure 6.1 System configuration

CC-I

CC-Link IE Field

Network

Remark •••

In this chapter, the following abbreviations are used for each module.

CC-Link IE Field Network master/local module (with safety functions)

CC-Link IE Field Network master/local module (with safety functions)

Network	Abbreviation	Module name			
	CC master (1)	CC-Link Safety master module (station No. 0)			
₋ink Safety	CC remote (1)	CC-Link Safety remote I/O module (station No. 1)			
	CC remote (2)	CC-Link Safety remote I/O module (station No. 2)			
		CC-Link IE Field Network master/local module (with safety functions)			
	CCIE master (0)	(station No. 0)			

(station No. 1)

(station No. 2)

## 6.2 Network-Related Switch Settings of Module

Set module switches as described below.

## 6.2.1 Safety power supply module

CCIE local (1)

CCIE local (2)

The safety power supply module does not have switches.

## 6.2.2 Safety CPU module

The safety CPU module does not have network-related switches.

## 6.2.3 CC-Link Safety master module

The CC-Link Safety master module does not have switches.

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## 6.2.4 CC-Link Safety remote I/O module

Set the link ID setting switch, station number setting switch, and transmission speed setting switch.



Figure 6.2 Positions of CC-Link Safety remote I/O module's switches

Table 6.1 Settings of CC-Link Safety remote I/O module's switches
---

Switch	Remote I/O	Safety programmable controller (1)		Safety pro contro	grammable oller (2)	Safety programmable controller (3)	
number	module number	CC remote (1) SR_M1IO1	CC remote (2) SR_M1IO2	CC remote (1) SR_M2IO1	CC remote (2) SR_M2IO2	CC remote (1) SR_M3IO1	CC remote (2) SR_M3IO2
1)	Link ID setting switch	0	0	0	0	0	0
2)	Station number setting switch	1	2	1	2	1	2
3)	Transmission speed setting switch	2 (2.5Mbps)	2 (2.5Mbps)	2 (2.5Mbps)	2 (2.5Mbps)	2 (2.5Mbps)	2 (2.5Mbps)

## 

For the procedure to validate the switch settings of the CC-Link Safety remote I/O module, refer to the following.

CC-Link Safety System Remote I/O Module User's Manual

# 6.2.5 CC-Link IE Field Network master/local module (with safety functions)

The CC-Link IE Field Network master/local module (with safety functions) does not have switches.

## 6.3 Parameter Settings

This section describes parameter setting examples.

For descriptions and setting ranges of the parameters, refer to the following.

CC-Link Safety System Master Module User's Manual

MELSEC-QS CC-Link IE Field Network Master/Local Module User's Manual

## 6.3.1 Parameter settings of CC-Link Safety

(1) Network parameter settings

Set the following values to the network parameters for safety master stations of safety programmable controllers (1) to (3) on CC-Link Safety.

Table 6.2 Setting example of network parameters

		Safety programmable controllers (1) to (3)			
	nouule	CC master (1)			
Start I/O No.		0000н			
Operational settings Case of CPU STOP setting <sup>*1</sup>		Clears compulsorily			
Mode		Safety remote net (Ver. 1 mode)			
Transmission speed		2.5Mbps			
Safety refresh monitoring	ng time	50ms			
Safety data monitoring	time	80ms			
Link ID		0			
All connect count		2			
Remote input (RX)		X100			
Remote output (RY)		Y100			
Remote register (RWr)		-			
Remote register (RWw)	)	-			
Special relay (SB)		SB0			
Special register (SW)		SW0			
Retry count		3			
Automatic reconnection	n station count	1			
Scan mode setting		Synchronous			
Station information	Station information	Section 6.3.1 (2)			
setting	Safety remote station settings	ر Section 6.4.1 (4)			
Remote device station	initial setting	None			

\* 1: Fixed at "Clears compulsorily" when the safety CPU operation mode is set to SAFETY MODE.

## 

Set the link ID and transmission speed values of the network parameter and those of the switches of the connected CC-Link Safety remote I/O module so that they may be the same.

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(2) Station information setting

Set station information of safety master stations on CC-Link Safety as follows. Table 6.3 Example of station information setting

Module		Station No.	Station type	Exclusive station count	Reserve station count
Safety programmable	CC master (1)	1/1	Safety remote I/O station	Exclusive station 1	No setting
controllers (1) to (3)		2/2	Safety remote I/O station	Exclusive station 1	No setting

(3) Safety remote station settings

For safety remote station settings of safety master stations on CC-Link Safety, refer to Section 6.4.1 (4).

# SAFETY APPLICATION CONFIGURATION EXAMPLE (USING SEVERAL SAFETY PROGRAMMABLE CONTROLLERS)

MELSEG QS series

## 6.3.2 Parameter settings of CC-Link IE Field Network

#### (1) Network parameter settings

Set the following values to the network parameters for the master station (safety station) and local stations (safety stations) on CC-Link IE Field Network.

#### Table 6.4 Setting example of network parameters

Module		Safety programmable controller (1) CCIE master (0)		Safety programmable controller (2) CCIE local (1)	Safety programmable controller (3) CCIE local (2)	
	Network type		CC IE Field (N [Safe	laster station	CC IE Field (Local station [Safety])	
	Starting I/O No.		0020н		0020н	0020н
Ethernet/CCTE/	Network No.		1		1	1
WELSEGNET	Total stations		2		(Cannot be set)	(Cannot be set)
	Station No.		0		1	2
	Mode		Online (Nor	mal Mode)	Online	Online
	Station No.		1	2		
	Station Type		Local S	Station		
		Points	(Blank)	(Blank)		
	RX/RY Setting	Start	(Blank)	(Blank)		
		End	(Blank)	(Blank)		
	RWw/RWr	Points	(Blank)	(Blank)		
		Start	(Blank)	(Blank)		
	Setting	End	(Blank)	(Blank)		
Notwork	Reserved/Error Invalid Station		No Setting	No Setting		
Configuration	Alias		(Blank)	(Blank)		(Operation of the sect)
	Comment		(Blank)	(Blank)	(Cannot be set)	(Cannot be set)
Setting		Link Scan	Select "Asynchronous",			
		Link Scan	and do not set "Constant			
		wode Setting	Scan".			
	Supplementary	Loopback				
	Supplementary	Function	Clear the "Use" checkbox.			
	Setting	Setting				
		Block Data				
		Assurance per	Assure BI	ock Data		
		Station				
Notwork	Parameter Name	2	(Blank)		(Blank)	(Blank)
Operation	Data Link Faulty	Station Setting	Turn OFF or 0 Clear Input Data (RX/RY)			
Setting	Output Setting D	uring CPU				
Setting	STOP*1			C	ieai (ALL UFF)	
Defeat	Link side					
Retresh	$\Leftrightarrow$		(Bla	nk)	(Blank)	(Blank)
parameters	PLC side					- /
Interlink transmiss	sion parameters		(Cannot	be set)	(Cannot be set)	(Cannot be set)
Routing parameters			(Blank)		(Blank)	(Blank)

\* 1: Fixed at "Clear (ALL OFF)" when the safety CPU operation mode is set to SAFETY MODE.

(2) Safety communication setting

Configure the following values to the safety communication setting for the master station (safety station) and local stations (safety stations) on CC-Link IE Field Network.

Module		Safety programmable controller (1)		Safety programmable controller (2)	Safety programmable controller (3)	
		CCIE master (0)		CCIE local (1)	CCIE local (2)	
Open Method			Active	Active	Passive	Passive
Transmission Interval Monitoring Time (ms)			50		50	50
Safety Refresh Monitoring Time (ms)			120	120	(Blank)	(Blank)
	Receive Data Storage Device	Device Name	Х	Х	Х	Х
		Points	128	128	128	128
Safety Data		Start	1000	1080	1000	1080
Transfer Device		End	107F	10FF	107F	10FF
Sotting	Send Data	Device Name	Y	Y	Y	Y
Setting	Storago	Points	128	128	128	128
	Device	Start	1000	1080	1000	1080
	Device	End	107F	10FF	107F	10FF

Table 6.5 E	Example of safet	y communication	setting

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## 6.4 Case Example

## 6.4.1 Emergency stop circuit (stop of all equipment)

(1) Application overview

This application uses a safety programmable controller in each process and cuts off a power to robots in all processes using an emergency stop switch in any process. The application controls the start and stop of a robot by turning on or off the main contact of the contactor which opens and closes the power source of a robot at the safety relay contact.

Connect emergency stop switches and safety relays to safety programmable controllers.

Connect safety programmable controllers in all processes through CC-Link IE Field Network. The safety programmable controller turns on/off the contacts of the safety relays with sequence program.

When the safety programmable controller detects an error by self-diagnostics, outputs to the safety relays turn off independent of the sequence program.

In this case, the outputs remain off until the safety CPU module or CC-Link Safety remote I/O module is reset independent of the sequence program.

Configure the sequence program so that the following functions can be achieved.

- Check that safety is ensured (The emergency stop signal is on.) and that an emergency stop request is not received from another safety programmable controllers on CC-Link IE Field Network. Press the reset switch and the start switch. The safety relay will turn on.
- 2) When a safety relay connected to any safety programmable controller is welded, input the auxiliary relays (normally closed contacts) to the safety programmable controller to prevent start of the robots, and check for welding.
- 3) The reset switch and start switch become valid only when turned off to avoid operation at contact welding or short-circuit.
- 4) Outputs of the safety relays turn off when input of the emergency stop switch turns off, an emergency stop request is received from another safety programmable controller on CC-Link IE Field Network, or an error is detected in a safety remote I/O station on CC-Link Safety after the operation is started.
- 5) To stop the entire system, transfer the emergency stop request to other safety programmable controllers.



Figure 6.3 Emergency stop circuit (stop of all equipment)

(Partially quoted from "Safety Guide Book - the safety measures of machinery in the workplace" : Nippon Electric Control Equipment Industries Association.)



Figure 6.4 Safety device connection diagram

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(3) Wiring diagram

(a) CC remote (1): SR\_M1IO1, SR\_M2IO1, SR\_M3IO1
 Wire the emergency stop switches and safety relays to CC-Link Safety remote I/O modules of safety programmable controllers (1) to (3) as follows.



Figure 6.5 CC remote (1) SR\_M1IO1, SR\_M2IO1, SR\_M3IO1 wiring (using a module of module technical version D or later)
(b) CC remote (2): SR\_M1IO2

Wire the reset switch and start switch to the CC-Link Safety remote I/O module of the safety programmable controller (1) as follows.



Figure 6.6 Remote (2) SR\_M1IO2 wiring (using a module of module technical version D or later)

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#### (c) CC remote (2): SR\_M2IO2, SR\_M3IO2

Wire the reset switches and start switches to CC-Link Safety remote I/O modules of safety programmable controllers (2) and (3) as follows.



Figure 6.7 CC remote (2) SR\_M2IO2, SR\_M3IO2 wiring (using a module of module technical version D or later)

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(4) Parameter settings

Configure safety remote station settings of the safety programmable controllers (1) to (3) as shown in Table 6.6 to Table 6.8.

Table 6.6 Safety remote station settings of the safety programmable controller (1)

(using a module of module technical version D or later)

- : Default (unused)

Modulo	Safety programmable controller (1) <sup>*6 *7</sup>				
Module	SR_M1IO1	SR_M1IO2			
Model name	QS0J65BTB2-12DT	QS0J65BTB2-12DT			
Module technical version <sup>*1</sup>	D	D			
Specify production information to find module	Specified (selected)	Specified (selected)			
Production information <sup>*2</sup>	100411110960100	100411110960150			
1. Time of noise removal filter X0, X1 <sup>*3</sup>	_	"1ms"			
2. Time of noise removal filter X2, 3 <sup>*3</sup>	"1ms"	_			
3. Time of noise removal filter X4, 5 <sup>*3</sup>	"1ms"	_			
9. Doubling input discrepancy detection time X0, 1 <sup>*4</sup>	-	"Do not detect"			
10. Doubling input discrepancy detection time X2, 3 <sup>*4</sup>	"100ms"	-			
11. Doubling input discrepancy detection time X4, 5 <sup>*4</sup>	"100ms"	-			
17. Input dark test selection X0, 1	-	"Not execute"			
18. Input dark test selection X2, 3	"Execute"	_			
19. Input dark test selection X4, 5	"Execute"	_			
25. Input dark test pulse OFF time*3	"400 µ s"	"400 µ s"			
28. Method of wiring of output Y2	"Doubling wiring (Source+Sink)"	_			
32. Output dark test selection Y2	"Execute"	-			
36. Output dark test pulse OFF time Y2*3	"1ms"	_			
38. Doubling/single input selection X0, 1 <sup>*5</sup>	-	"X0, X1: Single input"			
39. Doubling/single input selection X2, 3 <sup>*5</sup>	"Doubling input"	_			
40. Doubling/single input selection X4, 5 <sup>*5</sup>	"Doubling input"	_			
46. Auto RTN Func to detect doubling input mismatch $^{\rm \star 5}$	"invalid"	"invalid"			

\* 1: Check the module technical version on the rating plate located on the side of the module that is mounted on the corresponding safety remote I/O station on CC-Link Safety. Depending on module combination, the station cannot be connected. For details, refer to the following.

- CC-Link Safety System Remote I/O Module User's Manual
- \* 2: Enter the production information referring to the serial number printed on the rating plate located on the side of the module that is mounted on the corresponding safety remote I/O station on CC-Link Safety. For details, refer to the following.

CC-Link Safety System Remote I/O Module User's Manual

The production information is useful to maintain functions after the module is changed and to detect a setting error such as station number duplication of safety remote I/O stations on CC-Link Safety. Check the production information to use the safety programmable controllers properly and safely.

- \* 3: Adjust the values of Time of noise removal filter, Input dark test pulse OFF time, and Output dark test pulse OFF time according to the installation environment and wiring length.
- \* 4: Set Doubling input discrepancy detection time to 100ms for the mechanical switch and 20ms for the sensor input as a standard.



- \* 5: The parameters are added to the QS0J65BTB2-12DT of technical version D or later, and is not available for modules of technical version C or earlier.
- $^{\star}$  6: For setting range, refer to the following.
  - CC-Link Safety System Remote I/O Module User's Manual
- \* 7: Always set the enclosed option for this case example.

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#### Table 6.7 Safety remote station settings of the safety programmable controller (2)

#### (using a module of module technical version D or later)

Madula	Safety programmable controller (2) <sup>*6 *7</sup>				
Module	SR_M2IO1	SR_M2IO2			
Model name	QS0J65BTB2-12DT	QS0J65BTB2-12DT			
Module technical version <sup>*1</sup>	D	D			
Specify production information to find module	Specified (selected)	Specified (selected)			
Production information <sup>*2</sup>	100411110960200	100411110960250			
1. Time of noise removal filter X0, 1 <sup>*3</sup>	-	"1ms"			
2. Time of noise removal filter X2, $3^{*3}$	"1ms"	_			
3. Time of noise removal filter X4, $5^{*3}$	"1ms"	-			
9. Doubling input discrepancy detection time X0, 1 <sup>*4</sup>	-	"Do not detect"			
10. Doubling input discrepancy detection time X2, 3 <sup>*4</sup>	"100ms"	-			
11. Doubling input discrepancy detection time X4, 5 <sup>*4</sup>	"100ms"	_			
17. Input dark test selection X0, 1	-	"Execute"			
18. Input dark test selection X2, 3	"Execute"	-			
19. Input dark test selection X4, 5	"Execute"	-			
25. Input dark test pulse OFF time <sup>*3</sup>	"400 µ s"	"400 μ s"			
28. Method of wiring of output Y2	"Doubling wiring (Source+Sink)"	-			
32. Output dark test selection Y2	"Execute"	_			
36. Output dark test pulse OFF time Y2 <sup>*3</sup>	"1ms"	-			
38. Doubling/single input selection X0, 1 <sup>*5</sup>	-	"X0, X1: Single input"			
39. Doubling/single input selection X2, 3 <sup>*5</sup>	"Doubling input"	-			
40. Doubling/single input selection X4, 5 <sup>*5</sup>	"Doubling input"	-			
46. Auto RTN Func to detect doubling input mismatch <sup>*5</sup>	"invalid"	"invalid"			

\* 1: Check the module technical version on the rating plate located on the side of the module that is mounted on the corresponding safety remote I/O station on CC-Link Safety. Depending on module combination, the station cannot be connected. For details, refer to the

following.

- CC-Link Safety System Remote I/O Module User's Manual
- \* 2: Enter the production information referring to the serial number printed on the rating plate located on the side of the module that is mounted on the corresponding safety remote I/O station on CC-Link Safety. For details, refer to the following.

CC-Link Safety System Remote I/O Module User's Manual

The production information is useful to maintain functions after the module is changed and to detect a setting error such as station number duplication of safety remote I/O stations on CC-Link Safety. Check the production information to use the safety programmable controllers properly and safely.

- \* 3: Adjust the values of Time of noise removal filter, Input dark test pulse OFF time, and Output dark test pulse OFF time according to the installation environment and wiring length.
- \* 4: Set Doubling input discrepancy detection time to 100ms for the mechanical switch and 20ms for the sensor input as a standard.
- \* 5: The parameter is added to the QS0J65BTB2-12DT of technical version D. When a module of technical version C or earlier is used, the parameter is not available.
- \* 6: For setting range, refer to the following.
  - CC-Link Safety System Remote I/O Module User's Manual
- \* 7: Always set the enclosed option for this case example.

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- : Default (unused)

#### Table 6.8 Safety remote station settings of the safety programmable controller (3)

#### (using a module of module technical version D or later)

Modulo	Safety programmable controller (3) <sup>_6 *7</sup>				
Module	SR_M3IO1	SR_M3IO2			
Model name	QS0J65BTB2-12DT	QS0J65BTB2-12DT			
Module technical version <sup>*1</sup>	D	D			
Specify production information to find module	Specified (selected)	Specified (selected)			
Production information <sup>*2</sup>	100411110960300	100411110960350			
1. Time of noise removal filter X0, 1 <sup>*3</sup>	_	"1ms"			
2. Time of noise removal filter X2, $3^{*3}$	"1ms"	_			
3. Time of noise removal filter X4, $5^{*3}$	"1ms"	-			
9. Doubling input discrepancy detection time X0, 1 <sup>*4</sup>	_	"Do not detect"			
10. Doubling input discrepancy detection time X2, 3 <sup>*4</sup>	"100ms"	-			
11. Doubling input discrepancy detection time X4, $5^{*4}$	"100ms"	-			
17. Input dark test selection X0, 1	_	"Execute"			
18. Input dark test selection X2, 3	"Execute"	-			
19. Input dark test selection X4, 5	"Execute"	-			
25. Input dark test pulse OFF time*3	"400 μ s"	"400 µ s"			
28. Method of wiring of output Y2	"Doubling wiring (Source+Sink)"	-			
32. Output dark test selection Y2	"Execute"	-			
36. Output dark test pulse OFF time Y2 <sup>*3</sup>	"1ms"	-			
38. Doubling/single input selection X0, $1^{*5}$	_	"X0, X1: Single input"			
39. Doubling/single input selection X2, 3 <sup>*5</sup>	"Doubling input"	_			
40. Doubling/single input selection X4, 5 <sup>*5</sup>	"Doubling input"	_			
46. Auto RTN Func to detect doubling input mismatch <sup>*5</sup>	"invalid"	"invalid"			

\* 1: Check the module technical version on the rating plate located on the side of the module that is mounted on the corresponding safety remote I/O station on CC-Link Safety.

Depending on module combination, the station cannot be connected. For details, refer to the following.

- CC-Link Safety System Remote I/O Module User's Manual
- \* 2: Enter the production information referring to the serial number printed on the rating plate located on the side of the module that is mounted on the corresponding safety remote I/O station on CC-Link Safety. For details, refer to the following.

CC-Link Safety System Remote I/O Module User's Manual The production information is useful to maintain functions after the module is changed and to detect a setting error such as station number duplication of safety remote I/O stations on CC-Link Safety. Check the production information to use the safety programmable controllers properly and safely.

- \* 3: Adjust the values of Time of noise removal filter, Input dark test pulse OFF time, and Output dark test pulse OFF time according to the installation environment and wiring length.
- \* 4: Set Doubling input discrepancy detection time to 100ms for the mechanical switch and 20ms for the sensor input as a standard.
- \* 5: The parameter is added to the QS0J65BTB2-12DT of technical version D.
- When a module of technical version C or earlier is used, the parameter is not available.\* 6: For setting range, refer to the following.
  - CC-Link Safety System Remote I/O Module User's Manual
- \* 7: Always set the enclosed option for this case example.

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- (5) Devices used
  - (a) Relationship between safety CPU module devices and remote inputs/outputs in CC-Link Safety

The following shows the relationship between safety CPU module devices and inputs/outputs of safety remote I/O stations on CC-Link Safety with the settings described in Section 6.3.1.

Use devices in shaded areas in the sequence program.



Figure 6.8 Relationship between safety CPU module devices and remote inputs/outputs in CC-Link Safety

(b) Relationship among safety CPU module devices in CC-Link IE Field Network The following shows the relationship among safety CPU module devices with the settings described in Section 6.3.2.

Use devices in shaded areas in the sequence program.



Figure 6.9 Relationship among safety CPU module devices in CC-Link IE Field Network



#### (c) Device numbers to be used

#### The following device numbers are used in the sequence program. Table 6.9 Device numbers to be used

Safety programmable controller	Safety/standard	External device	Device number
	Safety	Emergency stop switch	X104 or X105
	Safety	Safety relay	Y102
	Safety	Safety relay (check for welding)	X102 or X103
	S of ot v	Emergency stop request from safety	X1000
	Salety	programmable controller (2)	× 1000
Safety	Cofety	Emergency stop request from safety	X1000
programmable	Safety	programmable controller (3)	X1080
controller (1)	Osfati	Emergency stop request to safety	N4000
	Safety	programmable controller (2)	¥1000
	0.1.1	Emergency stop request to safety	24000
	Safety	programmable controller (3)	¥1080
	Standard	Start switch	X121
	Standard	Reset switch	X120
	Safety	Emergency stop switch	X104 or X105
	Safety	Safety relay	Y102
	Safety	Safety relay (check for welding)	X102 or X103
Safety	S of ot v	Emergency stop request from safety	×1000
programmable	Salety	programmable controller (1)	21000
controller (2)	Cofety	Emergency stop request to safety	X4000
	Salety	programmable controller (1)	¥ 1000
	Standard	Start switch	X121
	Standard	Reset switch	X120
	Safety	Emergency stop switch	X104 or X105
	Safety	Safety relay	Y102
	Safety	Safety relay (check for welding)	X102 or X103
Safety	Safaty	Emergency stop request from safety	X1080
programmable	Salety	programmable controller (1)	21080
controller (3)	Sofoty	Emergency stop request to safety	¥1080
	Salely	programmable controller (1)	TIUOU
	Standard	Start switch	X121
	Standard	Reset switch	X120

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(6) Sequence program using safety FB

Figure 6.10 to Figure 6.12 show sequence programs used in safety programmable controllers (1) to (3).

Table 6.10 Safety FBs used					
FB name	Function name	Description			
		This FB monitors safety equipment such			
F+EDM	External device monitor	as an actuator and a contactor and			
		controls a safety output.			
		This FB is a safety-related FB for			
E.ECTOD	Emergency atom	monitoring an emergency stop button.			
FTESTOP	Emergency stop	This FB can be used for emergency			
		switch off functionality (stop category 0).			

78	X120	SD1072. 0						[SET	SD1076.0	3)	Ladder which releases the interlock when
81	SD1072.0	SD1076.0						[RST	SD1076.0	] }	on the safety remote I/O station on CC-Link Safety.
84	X120	SD1700. 0						[SET	SD1720.0	3	
87	SD1700. 0	SD1720. 0						[RST	SD1720.0	3	Ladder which releases the interleek when
90	X120 ₩	SD1700. 1						[SET	SD1720.1	]	an error occurs on CC-Link IE Field Network.
93	SD1700. 1	SD1720. 1						[RST	SD1720.1	] ]	
96	M2 	X120 X121							—(МЗ	> ]	Ladder which converts the Reset input bit of the safety FB, F+EDM.
102	SD1420. 0	X1080	X104						( <u>¥1000</u>	2	Ladder which notifies an emergency stop
106	SD1420. 1	X1000	X104						-( <u>Y1080</u>	) { }	(2) and (3).
110	SD1004. 0			B:Activate	+ESTOP (FB1	1) Ready:E	3			-1	
	SM401	X1000	<u>X1080</u>	B:S_EStopIn B:S_StartRese	t	S_EStopOut:E Error:E	3		—(M1 )		Ladder which monitors the status of the emergency stop switch. The safety FB is enabled by activating the
	SM401			B:S_AutoReset		DiagCode:V					reset switch after the programmable controller is powered on or after the emergency stop switch is activated and the safety output is turned off.
145	SD1004. 0	M1 		B:Activate	F+EDM (FB2)	) Ready:E	3				
	M1			B:S_OutContro	I	S_EDM_Out:E	3		—( <u>¥102</u>		
				B:S_EDM1		Error:E	3		—(M2 )	>	Ladder which monitors the contact welding in the safety relay.
				B:S_EDM2		DiagCode:V				-	on again by activating the start switch after the enable status is confirmed.
		-	[к	30 ] D:MonitoringT	ime						Activate the reset switch to clear an error occurred in the safety FB.
				B:S_StartRese	t						
				B:Reset							
192									[END	3	

Figure 6.10 Safety FB program for safety programmable controller (1)

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MELSEG **QS** series

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78 81	X120         SD1072.0           W         I           SD1072.0         SD1076.0				[s	ET SD1076.0 ST SD1076.0	]	Ladder which releases the interlock when communication failure or an I/O error occurs on the safety remote I/O station on CC-Link Safety.
84 87	<u>KT20</u> SM1700 → W→ ↓ ↓ SM1700 SM1720 → ↓ ↓				[s	ET SM1720 St SM1720	]	Ladder which releases the interlock when an error occurs on CC-Link IE Field Network.
90	M2 [X120] M2 [X121] M2 [X121]					(M3	)	Ladder which converts the Reset input bit of the safety FB, F+EDM.
96 99	SM1421 XT04 SD1004.0		F+ESTOP	(FB1) Ready B		( <u>Y1000</u>	>	Ladder which notifies an emergency stop request to the safety programmable controller (1).
	XT04         XT000		-B:S_EStopIn -B:S_StartReset	S_EStopOut:B Error:B		(M1	>	Ladder which monitors the status of the emergency stop switch. The safety FB is enabled by activating the reset switch after the programmable controller
	SM401 		- B:S_AutoReset - B:Reset	DiagCode∶W				is powered on or after the emergency stop switch is activated and the safety output is turned off.
133	SD1004.0 M1		F+EDM(F B:Activate	B2) Ready∶B				
			-B:S_OutControl -B:S_EDM1	S_EDM_Out∶B Error∶B		( <u>Y102</u> (M2	) )	Ladder which monitors the contact welding in the safety relay. The safety output of the safety FB is turned
		—[кзо ]	B:S_EDM2 D:MonitoringTime	DiagCode∶W				on again by activating the start switch after the enable status is confirmed. Activate the reset switch to clear an error occurred in the safety FB.
	SM401 		B:S_StartReset B:Reset					
180			L			[END	3	,

Figure 6.11 Safety FB program for safety programmable controller (2)

# SAFETY APPLICATION CONFIGURATION EXAMPLE (USING SEVERAL SAFETY PROGRAMMABLE CONTROLLERS)

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78 81 84	XT20         SD1072.0           SD1072.0         I           SD1072.0         SD1076.0           XT20         SD1076.0           XT20         SD1070.0			[SET[RST[RST[SET[SET	SD1076. ( SD1076. ( SM1720	0 ] 0 ] ]	Ladder which releases the interlock when communication failure or an I/O error occurs on the safety remote I/O station on CC-Link Safety.	OVERVIEW
87	SM1700 SM1720			Грут	SM1720	1	an error occurs on CC-Link IE Field Network.	2
90	M2 X120				(M3	L C	Ladder which converts the Reset input	z
							bit of the safety FB, F+EDM.	ATIO
96	SM1421 XT04				( <u>¥1080</u>	>	Ladder which notifies an emergency stop request to the safety programmable controller (1).	APPLIC EXAMP
99	SD1004. 0	- B:Activate	B1) Ready:B				Ladder which menitors the statue of the	ર
		-B:S_EStopIn	S_EStopOut:B		(M1	>	emergency stop switch. The safety FB is enabled by activating the	TEVEL C
		-B:S_StartReset	Error∶B			_	is powered on or after the emergency stop	ESSN ETY L
	SM401	- B:S_AutoReset	DiagCode∶W			_	turned off.	SK ASSI ID SAFE
		-B:Reset					,	ANA
133	SD1004.0 M1 3	-B:Activate	2) Ready∶B					<b>4</b>
		- B:S_OutControl	S_EDM_Out:B		(Y102	)		R USE
		- B:S_EDM1	Error∶B		(M2	>	Ladder which monitors the contact welding in the safety relay. The safety output of the safety FB is turned	PROGRAN LLER
		- B:S_EDM2	DiagCode∶W			_	on again by activating the start switch after the enable status is confirmed.	RECAU AFE TY I ONTRO
	[КЗО ]	]D:MonitoringTime					Activate the reset switch to clear an error occurred in the safety FB.	ت مەت 2
	SM401	-B:S_StartReset						C
	M3	- B:Reset					J	N EXAMPLE SAFETY E CONTRO
180					END	3		APPLIC URATION A SINGLE
	1					I		SAFETY CONFIG (USING/ PROGRA

Figure 6.12 Safety FB program for safety programmable controller (3)

For details on the safety FBs, F+ESTOP, and F+EDM, refer to the following. CF QSCPU Programming Manual (Safety FB)

#### (7) Timing chart



Figure 6.13 Timing chart

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# APPENDICES

# Appendix 1 Calculating Safety Response Time of CC-Link Safety

This manual explains the maximum value of safety response time. For normal values, refer to the following.

CC-Link Safety System Master Module User's Manual

To employ calculation formulas described in this section, use GX Developer and modules with the following versions.

For calculation formulas when GX Developer or any module with the version other than below is used, refer to the above manual.

GY Doveloper		Seria	l number (first five digits)				
Version	Safaty CBU modulo	CC-Link Safety	Safety remote I/O station on CC-Link Safety				
Version	Salety CPO module	master module	QS0J65BTS2-8D, QS0J65BTS2-4T	QS0J65BTB2-12DT			
Ver. 8.65T or later	10032 or later	10032 or later	10031 or later	10032 or later			

#### (1) Calculation method

The maximum value of safety response time will be the sum of (a) to (e) in Table APPX.1.

For timing when the safety response time will be the maximum value, refer to Figure APPX.1.

#### Table APPX.1 Calculation of safety response time (maximum value)

	Item	Maximum value
(a)	Input device response time	DT1
(b)	Safety remote station input response time	Refer to the user's manual for the safety remote I/O station used on
(D)	Salety remote station input response time	CC-Link Safety.
(C)	Monitoring time from safety input to safety output	Safety data monitoring time
	Safety remote station output response time	Refer to the user's manual for the safety remote I/O station used on
(u)		CC-Link Safety.
(e)	Output device response time	DT2
Tota	1	DT1 + DT2 + Safety remote station input response time + Safety
TOLE		data monitoring time + Safety remote station output response time



LS:	Link Scan Time of CC-Link Safety LS/WDT (Round up the calculated value to the pearest integer.)
m:	Safety refresh response processing time/(WDT $\times$ n) (Round up the calculated value to the
	nearest integer.)
	Safety refresh response processing time
DT1, DT2:	User's manual for the safety remote I/O station used on CC-Link Safety Response time of a sensor or output-target device. Check and add the response time of
Safety refresh monitoring time:	the device used. Time set in network parameter.
	Use the value gained by the following calculation formula as measure. In synchronous mode
	$(WDT \times n) \times 3 + ((WDT \times n) \times m) \times 2 + (WDT \times \alpha) [ms]$
	$\alpha$ : 0 when LS $\leq$ 1.5ms, 1 when LS > 1.5ms
	In asynchronous mode
	$(WDT \times n) \times 3 + LS + ((WDT \times n) \times m) \times 2 + (WDT \times \alpha) [ms]$
Safety data monitoring time:	$\alpha$ : 0 when LS $\leq$ 1.5ms, 1 when LS > 1.5ms Time set in network parameter for CC-Link Safety
	Use the value gained by the following calculation formula as measure.
WDT (Watchdog timer):	Safety refresh monitoring time $\times$ 2 - ((WDT $\times$ n) $\times$ m) - 10 [ms] Time set in programmable controller parameter.
	Calculate the SM (scan time) value referring to the following manual and set this timer
	value equal to or more than the calculated value.
Synchronous mode:	CFP QSCPU User's Manual (Function Explanation, Program Fundamentals) Mode which performs data link when sequence scan is synchronized with link scan.
	In synchronous mode, sequence scan and link scan start simultaneously.
Asynchronous mode:	CC-Link Safety System Master Module User's Manual Mode which performs data link without synchronizing sequence program
	CC-Link Safety System Master Module User's Manual

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(1) If setting value of the safety data monitoring time is equal to or less than the value gained by the calculation formula above, an error may occur even in normal communication status.
 If setting value of the safety data monitoring time is needlessly long, the time

taken for (c) in Table APPX.1 may lengthen in the case of a safety programmable controller error, resulting in excessive delay of safety response performance.

(2) The maximum value of safety response time is explained in this manual. For this reason, WDT, the maximum value of SM (scan time), is used in calculation formulas, instead of SM.

Use SM when calculating a normal value.

(3) When the safety CPU module detects CC-LINK DATA RECEPTION TIMEOUT (error code: 8320 to 8322), increase the safety refresh monitoring time and safety data monitoring time as needed.



(a) to (e) in the figure corresponds to (a) to (e) in Table APPX.1.

#### Figure APPX.1 Timing chart

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(a) Link scan time of CC-Link Safety (LS)

The following is the formula to calculate link scan time (LS) [ $\mu$ s] of CC-Link Safety.

LS = BT × (27 + (NI × 4.8) + (NW × 9.6) + (N × 30) + (ni × 4.8) + (nw × 9.6) + TR) + ST + RT+ F [ $\mu$ s] ··· LS calculation formula

BT: Co	nstant
--------	--------

Transmission speed	156kbps	625kbps	2.5Mbps	5Mbps	10Mbps
BT	51.2	12.8	3.2	1.6	0.8

- NI : Final station No. in A and B (Higher value between A and B) (including the station number of occupied station and excluding that of reserved station, in multiples of 8.)
- NW : Final station No. in B (including the station number of occupied station and excluding that of reserved station, in multiples of 8.)
- Final station No. of standard remote I/O stations on CC-Link Safety (including the station number of occupied station and excluding that of reserved station) (When not connecting standard remote station on CC-Link Safety, put 0 to
- A.)
   B : Final station No. of safety remote I/O stations on CC-Link Safety and remote device stations (including the station number of occupied station and excluding that of reserved station)

Final station No.	1 to 8	9 to 16	17 to 24	25 to 32	33 to 40	41 to 48	49 to 56	57 to 64
NI, NW	8	16	24	32	40	48	56	64
N ni a b	: Number : a + b : Total nu (excludi : Total nu remote	of conne mber of o ng the sta mber of o device sta	cted mode ccupied s tion numb ccupied s itions (exc	ules (exclu tandard re per of rese afety remo	uding rese emote I/O erved stati ote I/O sta e station n	erved stati stations c on) itions on C umber of	ons) on CC-Linl CC-Link Sa reserved	k Safety afety and station)
nw TR	: b : Constar	nt						
	C	onstant TR	Nume	eric value 38.4				
ST	: Constar (for asyı (1) or 2)	nt nchronous , whichev	s mode or er is grea	nly. For sy ter. Ignore	nchronous 2) when	s mode, S B = 0.)	T = 0.)	

1) 800 + (A × 15) 2) 900 + (B × 50)



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RT : Retry processing time (only when there is a faulty station)

- $\alpha$  +  $\beta$  × (Number of detected faulty stations 1)
- $\alpha$  : Retry processing time for first module
  - BT × ((200 + R) × Set number of retries + 200) R: 51.6 + (NI × 4.8) + (NW × 9.6)
- $\beta$ : Retry processing time for second or subsequent module BT × ((200 + P) × Set number of retries + 200)
  - P: 10.8
- F : Return to system processing time (only when a communication error station exists)

In synchronous mode:

- BT  $\times$  244.4 + 213.2  $\times$  (Number of automatic return modules -1)
- In asynchronous mode:
- BT  $\times$  218 + 213.2  $\times$  (Number of automatic return modules -1

# 

If connecting the remote I/O station on CC-Link Safety to the station with the reserved station setting, and then clear the setting, the values of NI, NW, N, ni, and nw in the LS calculation formula will change.

When the reserved station was changed, recalculate the LS and safety response performance.

For the reserved station function, refer to the following.

CC-Link Safety System Master Module User's Manual.



(2) Calculation example

This section describes calculation examples when the following values are set:

- WDT setting value: 10ms
- Link scan time (synchronous mode): 0.3ms
- Link scan time (asynchronous mode): 1.4ms
- Safety remote station input response time: 12.2ms
- Safety remote station output response time: 10.4ms
- Safety refresh response processing time: 9.6ms
- (a) Calculation example of safety refresh monitoring time
  - 1) In synchronous mode
    - n : LS/WDT = 0.3/10 ⇒ 1
    - m : (Safety refresh response processing time/(WDT  $\times$  n))
    - = 9.6/(10 × 1) → 1
    - $\alpha:$  LS = 0.3  $\leq$  1.5 ms  $\rightarrow$  0
    - $(WDT \times n) \times 3 + ((WDT \times n) \times m) \times 2 + (WDT \times \alpha)$  $= (10 \times 1) \times 3 + ((10 \times 1) \times 1) \times 2 + (10 \times 0)$
    - = 50 [ms]
  - 2) In asynchronous mode
    - n : LS/WDT = 1.4/10  $\Rightarrow$  1 m : (Safety refresh response processing time/(WDT × n)) = 9.6/(10 × 1)  $\Rightarrow$  1  $\alpha$  : LS = 1.4 ≤ 1.5 ms  $\Rightarrow$  0
    - $(WDT \times n) \times 3 + LS + ((WDT \times n) \times m) \times 2 + (WDT \times \alpha)$ = (10 × 1) × 3 + 1.4 + ((10 × 1) × 1) × 2 + (10 × 0) = 51.4 [ms]
- (b) Calculation example of safety data monitoring time
  - In synchronous mode Safety refresh monitoring time × 2 - ((WDT × n) × m) - 10 = 50 × 2 - (10 × 1 × 1) - 10 = 80 [ms]
  - 2) In asynchronous mode
    Safety refresh monitoring time × 2 ((WDT × n) × m) 10
    = 51.4 × 2 (10 × 1 × 1) 10
    = 82.8 [ms]



- (c) Calculation example for the maximum value of response time
  - 1) In synchronous mode
    - DT1 + DT2 + Safety remote station input response time + Safety data monitoring time + Safety remote station output response time = DT1 + DT2 + 12.2 + 80 + 10.4
    - = DT1 + DT2 + 102.6 [ms]
  - 2) In asynchronous mode
    DT1 + DT2 + Safety remote station input response time + Safety data monitoring time + Safety remote station output response time
    = DT1 + DT2 + 12.2 + 82.8 + 10.4
    = DT1 + DT2 + 105.4 [ms]
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(3) Calculation example of link scan time of CC-Link Safety
 The following shows the calculation example of LS (Link scan time) used in Appendix
 1 (2) Calculation example.

The following shows the calculation example when the transmission speed is 10 Mbps in the following system configuration example. (Condition: No communication error station exists.)



\*1: 1 occupied station \*2: 2 occupied station

• BT = 0.8 • NI = 5 ⇒ 8 • NW =  $5 \Rightarrow 8$ • N = 4 • ni = 5 • nw = 4 • A = 2, B = 5 • ST = 1150 1)  $800 + (2 \times 15) = 830$ 2) 900 +  $(5 \times 50) = 1150$ • TR = 38.4, RT = 0, F = 0 1) In synchronous mode LS = BT ×  $(27 + (NI \times 4.8) + (NW \times 9.6) + (N \times 30) + (ni \times 4.8) + (nw \times 9.6)$ + TR) + RT + F  $= 0.8 \times (27 + (8 \times 4.8) + (8 \times 9.6) + (4 \times 30) + (5 \times 4.8) + (4 \times 9.6) + 38.4)$ +0+0= 290.4 [µs] = 0.3 [ms] 2) In asynchronous mode LS = BT  $\times$  (27 + (NI  $\times$  4.8) + (NW  $\times$  9.6) + (N  $\times$  30) + (ni  $\times$  4.8) + (nw  $\times$  9.6) + TR) + ST + RT + F  $= 0.8 \times (27 + (8 \times 4.8) + (8 \times 9.6) + (4 \times 30) + (5 \times 4.8) + (4 \times 9.6)$ +38.4) + 1150 + 0 + 0= 1440.4 [µs] = 1.4 [ms]

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# Appendix 2 Calculating Safety Response Time When CC-Link Safety and CC-Link IE Field Network are Used







Figure APPX.2 Safety response time

Remark

Network	Abbreviation	Module name		
	CC master (1)	CC Link Safety magter medule		
CC Link Safaty	CC master (2)			
CC-LINK Salety	CC remote (1)	CC Link Safety remote 1/0 medule		
	CC remote (2)			
CC-Link IE Field	CC IE master	CC-Link IE Field Network master/local module (with safety functions)		
Network	CC IE local			

To employ calculation formulas described in this section, use GX Developer and modules with the following versions.

For calculation formulas when GX Developer or any module with the version other than below is used, refer to the following.

#### CC-Link Safety System Master Module User's Manual

GY Doveloper	Serial number (first five digits)			
GA Developel	Safaty CBU modulo	CC-Link Safety	Safety remote I/O station on C	C-Link Safety
version	Salety CPO module	master module	QS0J65BTS2-8D, QS0J65BTS2-4T	QS0J65BTB2-12DT
Ver.8.98C or later	13042 or later	10032 or later	10031 or later	10032 or later



#### (1) Calculation method

The maximum value of safety response time will be the sum of (a) to (c) in Table APPX.2 For normal values, refer to the following.

· Transmission time of CC-Link Safety

CC-Link Safety System Master Module User's Manual

Transmission time of CC-Link IE Field Network

F MELSEC-QS CC-Link IE Field Network Master/Local Module User's Manual

#### Table APPX.2 Calculation of safety response time (maximum value)

	Item	Maximum value
(a)	Input device response time	DT1
		Input transmission time of CC-Link Safety
(b)	Safety data transmission time (maximum value)	+ Transmission time of CC-Link IE Field Network
		+ Output transmission time of CC-Link Safety
(C)	Output device response time	DT2
Total		DT1 + DT2 + Safety data transmission time (maximum value)

DT1, DT2	: Response time of a sensor or output-target device. Check and add
Input transmission time of CC-Link Safety Transmission time of CC-Link IE Field Network Output transmission time of CC-Link Safety	<ul> <li>Refer to Appendix 2 (1) (a).</li> <li>Refer to Appendix 2 (1) (c).</li> <li>Refer to Appendix 2 (1) (b).</li> </ul>
(a) Calculating input	transmission time of CC-Link Safety
The following is Safety.	the formula to calculate input transmission time [ms] of CC-Link
Input transmission time of CC-Link Safety =	(Safety refresh monitoring time of CC master (1) $\times$ 2)
	+ Input response time of CC remote (1)
	- (((WDT (1) × n) × m) × 2 + (WDT (1) × n) + WDT (1)) [ms]
WDT (1) : A wate param	chdog timer for the safety CPU module (1). A value is set in PLC eter.
CCLS (1) : Link set	can time of CC-Link Safety in the safety CPU module (1)
n : CCLS	(1)/WDT (1) (Round up the calculated value to the nearest integer.)
m : Safety calcula	refresh response processing time/(WDT (1) $\times$ n) (Round up the ated value to the nearest integer.)
1) Safety refres	n monitoring time of CC-Link Safety
This time is re	equired to calculate input transmission time of CC-Link Safety.
For the calcu	lation method, refer to Appendix 1 (1).
2) Link scan tim	e of CC-Link Safety (CCLS (1))
This time is re	equired to calculate input transmission time of CC-Link Safety.
For the calcu	lation method, refer to Appendix 1 (1) (a).
The maximum va	alue of safety response time is explained in this manual. For this
reason, WDT, th	e maximum value of SM (scan time), is used in calculation

formulas, instead of SM.

Use SM when calculating a normal value.

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(b) Calculating output transmission time of CC-Link Safety The following is the formula to calculate output transmission time [ms] of CC-Link Safety.

Output transmission time of CC-Link Safety = (Safety refresh monitoring time of CC master (2) × 2) + Output response time of CC remote (2)

- (((WDT (2) × n) × m) × 2 + (WDT (2) × n) + WDT (2)) [ms]

- WDT (2) : A watchdog timer value for the safety CPU module (2). A value is set in PLC parameter.
   CCLS (2) : Link scan time of CC-Link Safety in the safety CPLL module (2).
- CCLS (2) : Link scan time of CC-Link Safety in the safety CPU module (2)
- n
   : CCLS (2)/WDT (2) (Round up the calculated value to the nearest integer.)

   m
   : Safety refresh response processing time/(WDT (2) × n) (Round up the
  - calculated value to the nearest integer.)
- Safety refresh monitoring time of CC-Link Safety This time is required to calculate output transmission time of CC-Link Safety. For the calculation method, refer to Appendix 1 (1).
- 2) Link scan time of CC-Link Safety (CCLS (2))
   This time is required to calculate output transmission time of CC-Link Safety.
   For the calculation method, refer to Appendix 1 (1) (a).

# 

The maximum value of safety response time is explained in this manual. For this reason, WDT, the maximum value of SM (scan time), is used in calculation formulas, instead of SM.

Use SM when calculating a normal value.

(c) Calculating transmission time of CC-Link IE Field Network The following is the formula to calculate transmission time [ms] of CC-Link IE Field Network.

Transmission time of CC-Link IE Field Network = (Safety refresh monitoring time of CC-Link IE Field Network × 4)

- (Transmission interval monitoring time of CC IE master  $\times$  3)
- (Transmission interval monitoring time of CC IE local  $\times$  4)
- + (WDT(2) × 3) [ms]
- 1) Safety refresh monitoring time of CC-Link IE Field Network

This time is required to calculate the transmission time of CC-Link IE Field Network. This is the time monitored by the receiving station for each safety connection to detect the following safety communication errors.

- · Safety communication stop due to an error on the sending station
- Safety communication stop due to an error on the transmission path, such as cable disconnection or hub failure

Set the time to one of the safety stations (active side) that performs safety

- communication.<sup>\*1</sup> The time value must satisfy the following formula.
- \*1 The active side and the passive side use the same safety refresh monitoring time.

Safety refresh monitoring time  $\geq$  Transmission interval monitoring time (active side)

- + Transmission interval monitoring time (passive side)
- + LS  $\times$  ( $\beta$  + 1) [ms]
- LS : Link scan time of CC-Link IE Field Network (Refer to Appendix 2 (1) (c) 3).)
- $\beta$  :• Number of safety connections on the active side  $\geq$  Number of safety connections on the passive side:

Number of safety connections on the active side  $\div$  8

- (Round up the calculated value to the nearest integer.)
- Number of safety connections on the active side < Number of safety connections on the passive side:

Number of safety connections on the passive side  $\div$  8 (Round up the calculated value to the nearest integer.)

If time between a safety data reception and the next safety data reception on the receiving station exceeds the safety refresh monitoring time, the receiving station detects an safety monitoring timeout error and stops safety communication. The safety data to be received from the sending station is cleared at the time.

#### 🖾 point -

When the safety CPU module detects a safety monitoring timeout error, check if the safety refresh monitoring time satisfies the formula above.

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- 2) Transmission interval monitoring time of CC-Link IE Field Network This time is required to calculate the transmission time of CC-Link IE Field Network. This is the time monitored by the receiving station for each safety connection to detect the following safety communication errors.
  - Delay in transmission interval of safety data due to an error on the sending station
  - · Safety data loss on the transmission path due to noise

Set the time to both safety stations (active side and passive side) that perform safety communication. The time value must satisfy the following formula.

Transmission interval monitoring time (asynchronous mode)<sup>\*1</sup> = WDT (1) of sending station + 2 [ms]<sup>\*2</sup>

or LS ×  $\alpha$  × 2 + 2 [ms]<sup>\*2</sup>

- \*1 When the link scan mode of the CC-Link IE Field Network master/local module (with safety functions) is synchronous mode, refer to the following.
- MELSEC-QS CC-Link IE Field Network Master/Local Module User's Manual
   \*2 Use the larger value.
  - WDT (1) : A watchdog timer for the safety CPU module (1). A value is set in PLC parameter.
  - LS : Link scan time of CC-Link IE Field Network (Refer to Appendix 2 (1) (c) 3).)
  - α : Number of safety connections at the sending station ÷ 8
     (Round up the calculated value to the nearest integer.)

If time between a safety data transmission and the next safety data transmission on the sending station exceeds the transmission interval monitoring time, the receiving station detects a safety monitoring timeout error and stops safety communication. The safety data to be received from the sending station is cleared at the time.

# **POINT**

- When the safety CPU module detects a safety monitoring timeout error, check if the transmission interval monitoring time satisfies the formula above.
- If the difference between the transmission interval monitoring time of own station and that of the communication target station is four times or more, change the transmission interval monitoring time so that the difference stays less than four times.

3) Link scan time (LS) of CC-Link IE Field Network

This time is required to calculate the transmission time of CC-Link IE Field Network. The following is the calculation example.

- LS = (Total points assigned for cyclic transmission × 0.08
  - + (Number of connected slave stations × Ka) + Kb + Kc + Kd) ÷ 1000
  - + (Number of interrupt conditions in the interrupt setting)  $\times$  0.02
  - + (Total Ke values of all stations) ÷ 1000 [ms]

Total points assigned for cyclic transmission:	Total number of points assigned for cyclic transmission,
	(RX points + RY points)/8

Number of connected slave stations

+ (RWr points + RWw points)  $\times$  2 [byte]

: Number of slave stations connected in a network

The following table lists values of factors for each cyclic transmission mode.

#### Table APPX.3 Factors used in the formula

Item	Cyclic transmission mode			
nem	Normal mode	High speed mode		
Ка	25.8	When "Set input data (RX/RY) to OFF or cleared to 0" is set in the Network Operation Setting: 18.5 When "Hold input data (RX/RY)" is set in the Network Operation Setting: 9.75		
Kb	655	168		
Kc (Maximum transient processing time)	160 +60 × Total number of slave stations set in the parameters	80		
Kd (Maximum data link processing time when the station is disconnected from or returned to the network)	9000 + Total nu	mber of ports used in the switching hub $ imes$ 3000		
Ke (Processing time factor of each module)	The following is the processi • CC-Link IE Field Network r Safety station: 300 Standard station: 0 • Other than the module abo	ing time factor of each module. Add values of all stations. naster/local module (with safety functions) we: 0		



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(2) Calculation example

In the system configuration of Figure APPX.2, when a signal from an emergency stop switch is input to the CC remote (1), a contactor connected to the CC remote (2) stops its output. This section describes examples for calculating safety response time for the situation above, using the following set values.

- WDT setting value for the safety CPU module (1) and (2): 10ms
- Input response time of CC remote (1): 12.2ms
- Output response time of CC remote (2): 10.4ms
- Safety refresh response processing time: 9.6ms
- (a) Calculation example of input transmission time of CC-Link Safety
  - 1) Link scan time of CC-Link Safety
    - This time is required to calculate input transmission time of CC-Link Safety. The following is the calculation example.

In these example, transmission speed, 10Mbps, is used. (Condition: No communication error station exists.)

- BT = 0.8
- NI =  $1 \rightarrow 8$
- NW = 1 → 8
- N = 1
- ni = 1
- nw = 1
- A = 0, B = 1
- ST = 950

1) 800 + (0 × 15) = 800

- 2) 900 + (1 × 50) = 950
- TR = 38.4, RT = 0, F = 0
  - In synchronous mode

LS = BT × (27 + (NI × 4.8) + (NW × 9.6) + (N × 30) + (ni × 4.8) + (nw × 9.6) + TR) + RT + F =  $0.8 \times (27 + (8 \times 4.8) + (8 \times 9.6) + (1 \times 30)$ + (1 × 4.8) + (1 × 9.6) + 38.4) + 0 + 0 =  $180 [\mu s]$ 

= 0.2 [ms]

• In asynchronous mode

LS = 
$$BT \times (27 + (NI \times 4.8) + (NW \times 9.6) + (N \times 30)$$
  
+  $(ni \times 4.8) + (nw \times 9.6) + TR) + ST + RT + F$   
=  $0.8 \times (27 + (8 \times 4.8) + (8 \times 9.6) + (1 \times 30)$   
+  $(1 \times 4.8) + (1 \times 9.6) + 38.4) + 950 + 0 + 0$   
=  $1130 [\mu s]$ 

= 1.2 [ms]

2) Safety refresh monitoring time of CC-Link Safety

This time is required to calculate input transmission time of CC-Link Safety.

- The following is the calculation example for CC master (1).
  - In synchronous mode
    - n: CCLS (1)/WDT (1) = 0.2/10 ⇒ 1
    - m: (Safety refresh response processing time/(WDT (1)  $\times$  n))
      - = 9.6/(10 × 1) ⇒ 1

 $\alpha$ : CCLS (1) = 0.2  $\leq$  1.5ms  $\Rightarrow$  0

 $(WDT (1) \times n) \times 3 + ((WDT (1) \times n) \times m) \times 2 + (WDT (1) \times \alpha)$ 

- =  $(10 \times 1) \times 3 + ((10 \times 1) \times 1) \times 2 + (10 \times 0)$
- = 50 [ms]
- In asynchronous mode
  - n: CCLS (1)/WDT (1) = 1.2/10 → 1
  - m: (Safety refresh response processing time/(WDT (1)  $\times$  n))
    - = 9.6/(10 × 1) ⇒ 1
  - $\alpha$ : CCLS (1) = 1.2  $\leq$  1.5ms  $\Rightarrow$  0

```
 (WDT (1) \times n) \times 3 + CCLS (1) + ((WDT (1) \times n) \times m) \times 2 + (WDT (1) \times \alpha) 
= (10 \times 1) \times 3 + 1.2 + ((10 \times 1) \times 1) \times 2 + (10 \times 0)
```

- = 51.2 → 52 [ms]
- 3) Input transmission time of CC-Link Safety

The following is the calculation example of input transmission time of CC-Link Safety.

• In synchronous mode

(Safety refresh monitoring time of CC master (1)  $\times$  2)

- + Input response time of CC remote (1)
- (((WDT (1)  $\times$  n)  $\times$  m)  $\times$  2 + (WDT (1)  $\times$  n) + WDT (1))
- $= (50 \times 2) + 12.2 (((10 \times 1) \times 1) \times 2 + (10 \times 1) + 10)$
- = 72.2 [ms] (Calculation result A-1)
- In asynchronous mode

(Safety refresh monitoring time of CC master (1)  $\times$  2)

- + Input response time of CC remote (1)
- (((WDT (1)  $\times$  n)  $\times$  m)  $\times$  2 + (WDT (1)  $\times$  n) + WDT (1))
- $= (52 \times 2) + 12.2 (((10 \times 1) \times 1) \times 2 + (10 \times 1) + 10)$
- = 76.2 [ms] (Calculation result A-2)



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- (b) Calculation example of output transmission time of CC-Link Safety
  - Link scan time of CC-Link Safety This time is required to calculate output transmission time of CC-Link Safety. For the calculation example, refer to Appendix 2 (1) (a).
  - 2) Safety refresh monitoring time of CC-Link Safety

This time is required to calculate output transmission time of CC-Link Safety. The following is the calculation example for CC master (2).

- In synchronous mode
  - n: CCLS (2)/WDT (2) = 0.2/10 ⇒ 1

m: (Safety refresh response processing time/(WDT (2)  $\times$  n))

 $\alpha$ : CCLS (2) = 0.2  $\leq$  1.5ms  $\Rightarrow$  0

(WDT (2)  $\times$  n)  $\times$  3 + ((WDT (2)  $\times$  n)  $\times$  m)  $\times$  2 + (WDT (2)  $\times \alpha$ )

 $(10 \times 1) \times 3 + ((10 \times 1) \times 1) \times 2 + (10 \times 0)$ 

- = 50 [ms]
- · In asynchronous mode
  - n: CCLS (2)/WDT (2) = 1.2/10 → 1

m: (Safety refresh response processing time/(WDT (2) × n))

- = 9.6/(10 × 1) ⇒ 1
- $\alpha$ : CCLS (2) = 1.2  $\leq$  1.5ms  $\Rightarrow$  0

 $(WDT (2) \times n) \times 3 + CCLS (2) + ((WDT (2) \times n) \times m) \times 2 + (WDT (2) \times \alpha) \\ = (10 \times 1) \times 3 + 1.2 + ((10 \times 1) \times 1) \times 2 + (10 \times 0)$ 

- = 51.2 → 52 [ms]
- 3) Output transmission time of CC-Link Safety

The following is the calculation example of output transmission time of CC-Link Safety.

· In synchronous mode

(Safety refresh monitoring time of CC master (2) × 2) + Output response time of CC remote (2)

- (((WDT (2)  $\times$  n)  $\times$  m)  $\times$  2 + (WDT (2)  $\times$  n) + WDT (2))
- $= (50 \times 2) + 10.4 (((10 \times 1) \times 1) \times 2 + (10 \times 1) + 10)$
- = 70.4 [ms] (Calculation result B-1)
- In asynchronous mode

(Safety refresh monitoring time of CC master (2)  $\times$  2)

- + Output response time of CC remote (2)
- (((WDT (2)  $\times$  n)  $\times$  m)  $\times$  2 + (WDT (2)  $\times$  n) + WDT (2))
- $= (52 \times 2) + 10.4 (((10 \times 1) \times 1) \times 2 + (10 \times 1) + 10)$
- = 74.4 [ms] (Calculation result B-2)

- (c) Calculation example of transmission time of CC-Link IE Field Network
  - 1) Link scan time (LS) of CC-Link IE Field Network

This time is required to calculate transmission time of CC-Link IE Field Network. The following is the calculation example. (Condition: Only safety communication is performed and no communication error station exists.) For Ka to Ke, use values when the station is set to Normal mode.

- LS = (((RX points + RY points)/8
  - + (RWr points + RWw points)  $\times$  2)  $\times$  0.08
  - + (Number of connected slave stations × Ka) + Kb + Kc + Kd) ÷ 1000
  - + (Number of interrupt conditions in the interrupt setting)  $\times$  0.02
  - + (Total of Ke values of each module) ÷ 1000
  - $= (0 + (1 \times 25.8) + 655 + (160 + 60 \times 1) + 0) \div 1000 + (0 \times 0.02)$ 
    - + (300 + 300) ÷ 1000
  - = 1.6 [ms]
- Transmission interval monitoring time of CC-Link IE Field Network This time is required to calculate transmission time of CC-Link IE Field Network. The following is the calculation example.

Transmission interval monitoring time = WDT (1) of sending station + 2 10 + 2 = 12 [ms]

> Safety refresh monitoring time of CC-Link IE Field Network This time is required to calculate transmission time of CC-Link IE Field Network. The following is the calculation example.

 $\beta$ : Number of safety connections/8 = 1/8  $\Rightarrow$  1

Safety refresh monitoring time  $\geq$  Transmission interval monitoring time (active side) + Transmission interval monitoring time (passive side) + LS × ( $\beta$  + 1)

- = 12 + 12 + 1.6 × (1 + 1)
- = 27.2 → 28 [ms]
- Transmission time of CC-Link IE Field Network The following is the calculation example of transmission time of CC-Link IE Field Network.

Transmission time of CC-Link IE Field Network = (Safety refresh monitoring time of CC-Link IE Field Network × 4)

- (Transmission interval monitoring time of CC IE master  $\times$  3)
- (Transmission interval monitoring time of CC IE local × 4)
- + (WDT(2) × 3)
- =  $(28 \times 4) (12 \times 3) (12 \times 4) + (10 \times 3)$
- = 58 [ms] (Calculation result C)



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- (d) Calculation example of safety response time (maximum value)
   The following is the calculation example of safety response time (maximum value).
  - · In synchronous mode

Safety response time (maximum value) = DT1 + DT2 + Safety data transmission time (maximum value)

- = DT1 + DT2
  - + Input transmission time of CC-Link Safety
  - + Transmission time of CC-Link IE Field Network
- + Output transmission time of CC-Link Safety
- = DT1 + DT2
  - + (Calculation result A-1) + (Calculation result C)
  - + (Calculation result B-1)
- = DT1 + DT2 + 72.2 + 58 + 70.4
- = DT1 + DT2 + 200.6 [ms]

· In asynchronous mode

- Safety response time (maximum value) = DT1 + DT2 + Safety data transmission time (maximum value) = DT1 + DT2
  - + Input transmission time of CC-Link Safety
  - + Transmission time of CC-Link IE Field Network
  - + Output transmission time of CC-Link Safety
  - = DT1 + DT2
    - + (Calculation result A-2) + (Calculation result C)
    - + (Calculation result B-2)
  - = DT1 + DT2 + 76.2 + 58 + 74.4
  - = DT1 + DT2 + 208.6 [ms]

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# Appendix 3 Checklist

	Table APPX.4 Checklist		
No.	Description	Reference	Check
Backu	p and version management of a file		
1	Were the created date and author entered at the top of the sequence program using the	Section 4 2(7)	
	statement function of GX Developer?	0000011 4.2(7)	
2	When modifying the sequence program, were the created date, author, and modified	Section 4 2(7)	
	description entered at the modified place using the statement function?		
3	Were the data downloaded to the programmable controller stored into the hard disk of a	Section 4.2(7)	
	personal computer or CD?		
Check	ing the setting		
4	Was it confirmed that the link ID, station number, and transmission speed of the CC-Link	Section 4.3(1)	
	Safety remote I/O module on the site were set as designed?		
5	Are the appropriate values set to "Safety refresh monitoring time", "Safety data monitoring	Appendix 1	
	time", and "WDT Setting" for CC-Link Safety?		
6	Are the appropriate values set to "Transmission Interval Monitoring Time" and "Safety	Appendix 2	
	Refresh Monitoring Time" in Safety communication setting for CC-Link IE Field Network?		
7	When the safety system is shifted to the actual operation, is the safety CPU operation	Section 4.4(3)	
	mode set to the SAFETY MODE?		
Opera	tion check	1	
8	Were all safety application functions (e.g. emergency stop function, restart interlock)		
	inspected?		
9	Were the response time of the safety application inspected?		
Check	ing write data		
10	Before writing the data to the programmable controller, was it confirmed that sequence	Section 4.3(2)	
	program and parameter setting values were configured as desired?		
11	Was it confirmed that the ROM information of CPU corresponds with that of the project file	Section 4.4(4)	
	with the ROM information screen of GX Developer?		
Others	8	1	
12	Was it confirmed that there are no errors with the LEDs on the module and the		
	programmable controller diagnostics screen of GX Developer?		
	In output signals from a safety CPU module to the CC-Link Safety master module on		
13	sequence program, was it confirmed that "prohibited to use" signal was not mistakenly		
	turned on or off? (For "prohibited to use" signal, refer to the CC-Link Safety System		
	Master Module User's Manual.)		
14	Are the registered passwords (Login password, CPU access password) managed	Section 4.4(5)	
	properly?		

Ĺ	MELSEC	QS series
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#### 1. Limited Warranty and Product Support.

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